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Purpose Scrutiny in
Constitutional Analysis
Ashutosh Bhagwat
In its constitutional law jurisprudence over the past twenty-five
years, the Supreme Court has generally declined to pass judgment on
the legitimacy of legislative ends. Instead, the Court has focused on the
rationalityand fitness of the means legislatures have chosen to attain
those ends. The Court's three-tiered approach to equal protection
analysis, the outlines of which it has also adapted to free speech cases,
exemplifies this eschewing of purpose inquiry. In the author's view,
however, a number of recent cases in these two contexts and in other
areas of constitutional law show an increased willingness by the Court
to inquire into and pass upon legislative purposes. Because this new
tendency has been haphazard and largely unannounced, the Court has
not tied its review of purpose to any firm set of principles. In the absence of such principles, the author believes that the new trend presents
counter-majoritariandangers, in addition to being unpredictable. He
therefore argues that the Court should explicitly lay out the classes of
cases that will receive particularlevels of purpose review, and tie that
review to the text and history of the constitutionalprovisions at issue in
each case. Finally, the authorpresents preliminary suggestions on how
such a framework might work.
INTRODUCTION

Constitutional law is changing. Consider the following recent, and
prominent, constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court and various
Circuit Courts of Appeals:
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court reviewed a Colorado constitutional amendment that prevented homosexuals from obtaining
statutory protection from discrimination, or any other sort of
specific, statutory protection. The Court applied its most lenient
standard of review-the "rational basis" test. Nonetheless, it
struck down the Colorado provision because it concluded that
the only possible motivation for the provision was "animus"
against a class of citizens, and that the provision therefore did
not advance any legitimate government end.'
1.

Romerv.Evans, 116S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
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Overruling at least one recent precedent, the Supreme Court
ruled that all race-based governmental actions, including benign
racial classifications adopted as part of an affirmative action
program, are subject to "strict scrutiny," the most searching
standard of review available under the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court then remanded the case to the lower courts to determine if the program in question satisfied the requirements of
strict scrutiny, which requires the courts to determine whether the
government interests served by a classification are "compelling."2
Also under the Equal Protection Clause, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit struck down an admissions policy at
the University of Texas Law School that gave preference to
minority candidates for admission. The Fifth Circuit also applied strict scrutiny, as it claimed was required by precedent. It
ruled, among other things, that promoting student diversity
could never qualify as a "compelling" government interest. In
so holding, the court declined to follow an earlier Supreme
Court decision that seemed to permit universities to use race as a
factor in graduate school admissions decisions.3
In a splintered decision, the Supreme Court held that a federal
statute requiring cable television operators to set aside a certain
number of channels to carry the signals of local television
broadcasters without charge is a "content-neutral" law. As
such, the Court subjected the statute only to "intermediate scrutiny" under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. One of
Congress' clear purposes in adopting the statute was to foster diversity among sources of information. The majority and dissent
disagreed most sharply over whether, because of this purpose,
the statute should be considered
"content-based" and therefore
4
subject to strict scrutiny.
Again under the Free Speech Clause, the Supreme Court struck
down a Rhode Island law prohibiting off-premises advertising of
liquor prices. A majority of the Court declined to apply the
Court's well-established test for restrictions on "commercial
speech," instead choosing to apply a stricter standard of review
because the law entirely suppressed a category of truthful commercial speech. Along the way, the Court disavowed a precedent

2. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (overruling Metro Broad., Inc.
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
3. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (declining to follow Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v.Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)). But see Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.)
(upholding a race-conscious hiring process for state prison guards).
4. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
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that seemed to permit states to suppress the advertising of
"vice" products in order to limit consumption.'
Against a First Amendment challenge, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a federal statute and
regulations banning the broadcast of "indecent materials"
between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. Although it
found that the provision was a content-based regulation, the D.C.
Circuit held that it satisfied even "strict" scrutiny. The majority
and dissent agreed that the government has a "compelling
interest" in supporting parental supervision of children's exposure to indecent materials, but disagreed over whether the government has an independent interest in preventing minors'
exposure to indecency regardless of their parents' wishes.
Twenty-five years ago, Gerald Gunther urged the Supreme Court to
adopt a newer equal protection analysis that would focus on the propriety and rationality of the means employed by legislatures to achieve
their goals, rather than on the validity of legislative ends.7 In the years
that have followed, the Court has largely accepted that invitation, constructing a three-tiered doctrine of equal protection review that, at least
in name, also guides the Court's constitutional analysis in many other
doctrinal areas, notably including free speech cases. The cases described above, which apply different constitutional provisions and are
drawn from different doctrinal contexts, reveal fissures in that approach.
It is the thesis of this Article that these and other recent cases are
examples of a trend within the Court's jurisprudence toward an increased focus on the ends that the government seeks to advance with its
actions, including an analysis of the true purposes underlying those actions-in the words of the current doctrine, an increased focus on
''government interests." Such a trend would represent a substantial
departure from previous practice, which concentrated mainly on scrutiny of government means, and on balancing the strength of government interests against individual rights.
If the shift toward purpose scrutiny is a real and significant trend, it
will have important and controversial implications for constitutional
theory and practice. Purpose scrutiny will call the constitutionality of
many government actions into question, and will permit some actions

5. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996) (calling into doubt Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986)).
6. Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACTI!!), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996).
7. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L REV. 1, 20-22

(1972).
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heretofore thought unconstitutional. In sum, it will substantially alter
the contours of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence.
In addition to identifying and demonstrating the trend toward
purpose scrutiny in recent decisions, this Article also contends that the
Supreme Court's increased scrutiny of governmental purposes is a positive development that the Court should continue and expand. It is, however, equally imperative that the Court develop a coherent analytical
framework so that it may apply purpose scrutiny in a principled manner. Without a principled and constitutionally-rooted framework, judicial second-guessing of the validity of the purposes pursued by the
elected branches can lead to troubling results. Until now, the Court has
failed to develop such a framework, the lack of which has brought its
efforts at purpose scrutiny into question. One important contention of
this Article is that purpose scrutiny, like all constitutional review, cannot
retain its legitimacy and authority unless it is ultimately grounded in the
Constitution. This Article proposes a purpose scrutiny framework that
will provide the constitutional grounding that the Court's current means
analysis lacks.
This Article attempts to identify principles that the Court may use
to guide its purpose scrutiny in a manner consistent with its constitutional role. In doing so, it draws on recent Supreme Court cases and the
developing academic commentary on governmental interests. Recent
case law and commentary suggest three quite distinct ways in which the
Court has employed-and should employ-purpose scrutiny in constitutional analysis. First, some governmental purposes, when they underlie actions burdening particular constitutional rights, are entirely
illegitimate. Second, when core constitutional infringements are at issue,
the universe of permissible governmental purposes is extremely limited,
and its limits will be determined by the nature of the right allegedly
burdened. Third, when neither illegitimate purposes nor core infringements are at issue, the Court has tended to, and most definitely should,
defer substantially to the choices of democratically elected representatives, at least as to the importance and propriety of the purposes they
have chosen to pursue. Finally, this Article compares the purpose scrutiny framework to the Court's existing three-tiered doctrine, suggesting
ways in which the existing doctrine might be modified and extended to
incorporate purpose scrutiny.
The discussion here is necessarily a preliminary one, indicating
possible directions in which theory and analysis can move. Purpose
scrutiny cannot provide a blueprint for all areas of constitutional law.
Indeed, if one theme emerges from the following pages, it is that many
of the Court's current doctrinal difficulties stem from the search for
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grand constitutional approaches, which are then applied without modification to areas of law for which they were not designed.
I
THE COURT'S DEVELOPING JURISPRUDENCE

A. TraditionalDoctrine: Means Scrutiny Under the
Three-Tiered Approach
Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence where individual rights are concerned-with the exception of
criminal procedure-has come to be dominated by a three-tiered system
under which governmental action is categorized according to some predetermined criteria, and then subjected to an appropriate level of scrutiny. Actions that look particularly suspicious are subject to "strict
scrutiny," those that are somewhat suspicious are subject to
"intermediate scrutiny," and the most innocuous receive "rational basis" review.
1. Equal Protection Jurisprudenceand the Origins of the
Three-Tiered Approach
In the equal protection area, the Court decides which level of
scrutiny to apply by examining the challenged law for "suspect" classifications or impingements of "fundamental rights." Government classifications that are suspect-such as those based on race, alienage, or
national origin-or that are used to burden the exercise of certain
fundamental rights-such as the right to speak, the right to vote, or the
right to travel between states-are subject to strict scrutiny. Under strict
scrutiny, the classification will survive only if it is narrowly tailored to
8
advance a compelling government interest.
Similarly, the Court applies intermediate scrutiny to those classifications it considers "semi-suspect"-such as those based on gender or
illegitimacy. Such a classification will be upheld if it is substantially
related to the achievement of an important government interest.' All
other classifications, which are not based on suspect classes and do not
burden fundamental rights, face only the lenient rational basis test,
under which they must merely be rationally related to a legitimate
government interest to survive."
8. See, e.g., Adarand ConstructorsInc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995); City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,
395 U.S. 621,632 (1969); Shapiro v- Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
9. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441; Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724 (1982); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 508 (1976); cf. United States v. Virginia (VMI), 116 S.
Ct. 2264,2275 (1996).
10. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (citing
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
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Thus, the analysis formally requires three steps-categorization of
the means, scrutiny of the strength of the chosen ends, and examination
of the "fit" between the means and the ends. An objection might be
raised here that the definitions of the three tiers of scrutiny appear to
include standards for the examination of government purposes. After
all, the very language of the strict scrutiny test does require that the class
be narrowly tailored to advance a "compelling government interest."
In fact, however, the categorization process has in most cases been outcome-determinative. Indeed, even scrutiny of the fit between means and
ends has tended to be a mere formality, and ends scrutiny has been notably absent. The rational basis test is extremely permissive, and in the
case of economic or social legislation has traditionally led to almost
automatic approval. On the other hand, strict scrutiny has historically
tended to be, in the oft-quoted words of Gerald Gunther, "'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact."" The three-tiered approach tended to look
only at the classifications used by the government, which are the means
that the government had chosen to accomplish its purposes. It never got
around to its promised analysis of the purposes themselves. Apart from
the exceptional case, 2 placement into either the highest or lowest tier
was decisive. Application of the middle tier, intermediate scrutiny, has
led to slightly more uncertainty, but has increasingly led to invalidation
in the equal protection context, absent unusual circumstances. 3
2. Tiers and Free Speech Jurisprudence
Although the three-tiered approach is rooted in the Equal
Protection Clause, it has spread to other areas of constitutional law. In
recent years, the Court's First Amendment free speech jurisprudence,
originally distinct from its equal protection jurisprudence, has entirely
succumbed to the tiered-review model. 4 In the free speech area, a
166, 174-75 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,

303 (1976)).
11.

Gunther, supranote 7,at 8. But see Adarand Constructors, 115 S.Ct. at 2117 (suggesting

that certain race-based classifications might withstand strict scrutiny).
12. See, e.g., Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (striking down
law placing special burdens on "hippies" under rational basis standard); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (approving forced relocation of Japanese Americans during World War II
under an embryonic "strict scrutiny" standard).
13. See, e.g., VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2287 (invalidating the male-only admissions policy at the
Virginia Military Institute). But see, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (upholding the
male-only registration provisions under the Military Selective Service Act).
14. For a description and criticism of the gradual-and apparently inadvertent-absorption of
equal protection doctrine into free speech cases, see Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New
York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124-28 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); C. Edwin
Baker, TurnerBroadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 Sup. Cr. REv.
57, 116 (criticizing this development as misguided). I have elsewhere extensively discussed recent
developments in First Amendment doctrine, and the following description draws on that analysis. See
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regulation is subject to strict scrutiny if it is "content-based." Regulations that the Court deems "content-neutral," on the other hand, are
subject to the Ward/O'Brien balancing test, 5 an intermediate form of
scrutiny.
The Ward/O'Brien approach is essentially an ad hoc
balancing test.'6 It has evolved from a number of different strands in
the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence-including, notably, its
cases concerning regulation of the public forum, regulation of expressive conduct, and regulation of commercial speech-into a universal test
for content-neutral regulations. 7 Finally, although the Court has not
expressly so held, its cases suggest that minor and incidental burdens on
speech imposed by laws not directed at speech as such are subject to
minimal or no First Amendment scrutiny. As with its equal protection
cases, therefore, the Court's free speech analysis has become dominated
by tiers, with at least the highest and lowest tiers being largely outcomedeterminative.
3. Tiers and Privacy Jurisprudence
Tiered review has also been adopted in the area of the so-called
"privacy" rights, meaning the unenumerated rights the Court has
found in the Due Process Clause and the Ninth Amendment."
If a
regulation impinges upon a fundamental right, it has been subjected to
strict scrutiny, as defined in the equal protection context.20 If no fundamental right is implicated, however, the law will be subjected only to
rational basis review and generally upheld.2 ' But the story is clearly
more complex with regard to privacy rights than with equal protection
and free speech doctrine. At least in the context of regulations limiting
the constitutional right to an abortion, the above statement of the
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The FirstAmendment, the New Mass Media, and the
PoliticalComponents of Culture,74 N.C. L Rav. 141, 158-76 (1995).
15. See Turner Broad.Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2458-59 (1994); Simon & Schuster,
502 U.S. at 112; Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Bhagwat, supranote 14, at 166-67.
16. By "ad hoc balancing," I mean an approach that appears to decide cases based on the
intuitive judgment of a majority of the Court about the relative strengths of the governmental and

individual interests presented in the case. For a further discussion of balancing in current doctrine,
see infra text accompanying notes 71-76.

17.

See Bhagwat, supra note 14, at 167-69.

18. For an insightful discussion of this aspect of the Court's jurisprudence, see Michael C. Dorf,
Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L RaV. 1175, 1204-07 (1996) (discussing
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986)).
19. These include the right to choose an abortion, the right to sexual privacy including the use
of contraceptives, the right to marry, and rights associated with a parental relationship. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
20. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at388; Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
21. See Bowers v Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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Court's approach to privacy-rights cases may no longer be correct. In
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court adopted an "undue burden"
standard, suggesting that regulations that impose an undue burden on
the abortion right are per se unconstitutional-not merely subject to
strict scrutiny-whereas other regulations are per se constitutional.22
Privacy doctrine thus also focuses on the means used by the government to accomplish its purpose. Once the means are categorized,
however, the case is decided; no analysis of purpose is undertaken, nor
indeed does the Court even bother with the fig leaf of determining
whether the chosen means are a good "fit" for the asserted ends, as the
equal protection and free speech cases purport to do. Casey's brightline per se standard may be explicable as an acknowledgment that,
where pre-viability abortions are concerned, strict scrutiny is necessarily
"fatal in fact" because the Court has already conducted the necessary
inquiry and has decided that no possible government interest justifies
such a regulation. If this view is correct, rational basis review should
result in regulations being upheld, for similar reasons." Thus, like equal
protection and free speech, privacy analysis can also be seen as an example of outcome-determinative, means-based analysis because of its
structure. Where it differs is that current privacy doctrine seems to have
only two tiers, rather than the three provided in equal protection and
free speech analysis. Privacy jurisprudence does not appear to have
room for a middle tier of review under which rights and interests are
balanced.24 Even though the symmetry is not perfect, the enormous influence of the Court's tiered approach is evident in this area of individual rights jurisprudence as well.
B. Historicaland PracticalLimits of the
Three-Tiered Approach
"Tiers" and "scrutiny" are thus the watchwords of current doctrine. This mode of review is not, however, inevitable, nor does the language of the three-tiered approach fully describe the cross-currents
driving the Court's decisions. First, despite how firmly entrenched the
approach has now become, the "tiers" of current doctrine are largely a
product of the later Warren and Burger courts, although older cases do
22. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874; see also Dorf, supranote 18, at 1220 n.198.
23. See Alan Brownstein, How Rights are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in
ConstitutionalDoctrine, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 867, 878-81 (1994). As I will discuss later, this explanation
of Casey leaves open a difficult question of how to deal with laws that are meant to burden the
abortion right in impermissible ways, but impose a relatively minor burden. See infra Part llI.C.
24. See Brownstein, supra note 23, at 926, 939. This distinction may be of less importance than
meets the eye, however, because as Brownstein acknowledges, in close cases of somewhat
burdensome abortion regulations, the Court appears to weigh government interests and the burden on
individual rights in the course of making the undue burden determination. See id. at 891.
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hint at the approach. The first use of the phrase "strict scrutiny" in an
equal protection challenge to a race-based classification appears in the
Japanese-American internment cases during World War II,' and the
concepts underlying strict scrutiny can be traced back to the famous
footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case.26 The phrase "compelling
government interest" seems to have made its first appearance in Justice
Frankfurter's 1957 concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.'
Despite these antecedents, however, tiered review did not become the
equal protection methodology until the late 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, as discussed above, the adoption of tiered review in the First
Amendment area seems to have been almost inadvertent,28 and the use of
tiered scrutiny continues to be disputed, or applied inconsistently, in the
privacy cases.
Moreover, the vagueness and undeveloped nature of tiered scrutiny
is an even greater challenge to its authoritativeness than its relatively recent vintage. In this respect, Gerald Gunther's prescient insights of
twenty-five years ago are extremely valuable. With the exception of a
clearly problematic classification, such as one based on race, Gunther
urged the Court to focus its equal protection scrutiny on the means chosen by the government to pursue its ends, rather than on the validity of
the ends themselves.29 The reason Gunther gave for his suggestion is
especially telling, namely, "[t]he avoidance of ultimate value judgments
about the legitimacy and importance of legislative purposes." ''
In the years that followed, the Court seemed to listen. The hallmark of the Court's individual rights jurisprudence during the Burger
Court and until quite recently has been a great reluctance to question
the legitimacy of governmental purposes, even when the asserted government purpose seems quite clearly pretextual and the true purpose
illegitimate.3 And even when the government's purpose is known and
not controverted, as in the typical case, the Court has strongly preferred
to use means scrutiny to strike down (or uphold) the government action,
25. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943). Of course, in these cases the Court, having identified the racism underlying the
internment orders, then "inexplicably" upheld them. Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.

2097, 2106 (1995).
26. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
27. 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,concurring in the result); see also 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 337 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986)
[hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA].
28. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 124-28 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
29. See Gunther, supra note 7, at 20-24.
30. Id. at 21-22.
31. See generally Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598
(1985); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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rather than seriously considering whether the asserted ends were

"important" or "compelling."32 Indeed, as numerous commentators

have pointed out, the Court's analysis of "government interests," and

in particular what constitutes a compelling or important interest, is almost entirely undeveloped.3 These commentators have argued that the
Court has never identified any guiding principles upon which it could
base judgments about the validity of democratically-selected purposesa point that a number of Justices have made as well.3 This may be an
overstatement-one might argue that within the vast number of means
scrutiny cases the kernels of a coherent analysis of governmental purposes exist. One might even argue that in a substantial number of cases,
means scrutiny has served the Court as a guise for assessing ends, and
that this tendency has accelerated in recent years as part of the Court's
generally increased concern with government purposes. 35 The recent
predominance of means scrutiny, both in name and in fact, is nonetheless extraordinary, and seems most adequately explained by the at least
implicit acceptance by the Supreme Court of Gunther's critique of judicial scrutiny of governmental purposes.
The predominance of means analysis in constitutional doctrine is
troubling for both practical and theoretical reasons. As a practical matter, judicial reliance on means scrutiny is questionable because courts
are not very good at this type of analysis. Legislatures, not courts, have
32. See Carl E. Schneider, State-InterestAnalysis in FourteenthAmendment "Privacy" Law: An
Essay on the Constitutionalizationof Social Issues, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1988, at 79, 89
n.55 (making this point about the Court's privacy cases). That the Court has strongly tended to prefer
means scrutiny over ends scrutiny across doctrinal areas is a conclusion I have drawn from
reviewing the Court's individual-rights jurisprudence over recent years. The conclusion is difficult to
prove, but is I think relatively uncontroversial, and I am quite convinced it is correct.
33. See ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 27, at 337; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in
the Age of Balancing,96 YALE L.J. 943, 977 (1987); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the
Powers of Government, 27 GA. L REV. 343, 348-50 (1993); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling
GovernmentalInterests: An EssentialBut Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L
REV. 917, 932-37 (1988); Schneider, supra note 32, at 92-93; Steve Sheppard, The State Interest in
the Good Citizen: ConstitutionalBalance Between the Citizen and the PerfectionistState, 45 HASTINGs
LJ. 969, 983-85 (1994); David Charles Sobelsohn, Note, Of Interests, Fundamental and Compelling:
The Emerging ConstitutionalBalance, 57 B.U. L REV. 462, 479-80 (1977).
34. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 580 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in
the judgment); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 233-34 (1989)
(Stevens, J.,
concurring) (quoting Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S.
173, 183-85 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)); see also Stephen E. Gottlieb, Introduction to PU3LIC
VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2-4 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993) [hereinafter PUBLIC
VALUES].

35. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in
ConstitutionalLaw, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 711, 711-15 (1994); Lawrence G. Sager, Some Observations
About Race, Sex, and Equal Protection, 59 TUL. L REV. 928, 938 (1985); Schneider, supranote 32, at
92; see also infra text accompanying notes 73, 255 (considering possibility that some decisions
denominated in terms of means scrutiny actually demonstrate a concern with the propriety of
governmental purposes).
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the best institutional ability to identify and assess the efficacy of means.
When courts do second-guess legislative choices of this nature, they tend
to be either proceeding ad hoc or disguising their true concerns. 6 As a
theoretical matter, the almost exclusive judicial focus on means is
troubling because it ignores the fact that the Constitution enacts substantive, and not merely procedural, limits on government action. The
Constitution constrains not merely how the government acts, but also,
and more significantly, what the government may seek to do.37
An important point to consider about the modern focus on means
scrutiny, and the corresponding lack of scrutiny of government purposes, is that it was not always so. As many scholars have pointed out,
prior to the emergence of the New Deal Court and the tradition of judicial deference to economic and social legislation, the Supreme Court
and other courts routinely considered the validity of governmental purposes in assessing constitutionality. Indeed, the prevalent doctrinal
analysis during the Lochner38 era in the first part of this century required that a challenged law have a "reasonable relationship" to "some
purpose within the competency of the state," with the latter requirement
giving the standard some bite. Accordingly, the Court's analysis focused almost entirely on the validity of governmental purposes and was
quite deferential regarding the legislative choice of means.39 Thus, when

the Lochner Court invalidated economic legislation, as it regularly did, it
relied on its view of which governmental objectives were permissible. In
particular, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited governments from pursuing certain types of
interventions in private markets, or other forms of economic paternalism.
Moreover, from the time of the Framers at least until the modern
period, it was understood that federal statutes passed for pretextual purposes would not withstand scrutiny, even if the facial purpose was within
Congress' allotted powers.' Courts did not defer to a given statement
of purposes, and when they had identified the actual purposes of a given
regulation, they then scrutinized those purposes against constitutional

36. See infra Part II.A.
37. See generallyLaurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
38. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
39. See Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 951; David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory
of ConstitutionalAdjudication,88 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 647-48 (1994); Gottlieb, supra note 33, at 975;
Gunther, supra note 7, at 42-43; Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: ConstitutionalBalancing, 78
COLUM. L REV. 1022, 1042 (1978); Pildes, supra note 35, at 712-13; Schneider, supra note 32, at 82
n. 11, 88 n.53.
40. See Dorf, supra note 18, at 1191-92; Lawrence Lessig, UnderstandingChanged Readings:
Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REv. 395, 448 (1995).
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limitations that they had defined.4' Of course, the jurisprudence of the
Lochner Court, most notably the Court's repeated invalidation of economic and social regulation on freedom-of-contract grounds, has been
thoroughly disavowed, and is in almost complete disrepute.4 2 In addition, and perhaps relatedly, the Supreme Court has long since gotten out
of the business of striking down federal legislation because it believes
that Congress' motives were not within its delegated authority, and that
the invocation of its Article I power was pretextual. 43 These are generally, and quite properly, considered to be positive developments, because the Lochner Court undoubtedly had an unnecessarily narrow view
of the permissible aims of government action. What is less self-evident,
however, is the assumption that by rejecting the actual jurisprudence of
the Lochner era, modem courts must also entirely turn away from some
facets of the constitutional methodology of that era, including scrutiny
of government purposes.' This is not to devalue the important lessons
to be learned from the overreaching of the Lochner court-most notably including the dangers of unconstrained and unprincipled purpose
scrutiny. But the lessons may not be quite as all-encompassing as the
post-New Deal Court has assumed.
Before discussing the recent developments in purpose scrutiny that
are the focus of this Article, one last point about the constitutional
methodology of the modem Court should be considered-the
omnipresent question of the role of "balancing."
Since Alexander
45
Aleinikoff's path-breaking 1987 article, and perhaps even before,46
scholars and judges have debated the role and legitimacy of

41. For a somewhat different view of the Lochner era and its relationship to modern
constitutional law, see Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudenceand the American Constitutional
Tradition,70N.C.L REV. 1 (1991).

42.

See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L REv. 873, 873-75 (1987). But see
277-82 (1985).

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS

43. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903). But see United States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631-33 (1995) (striking down legislation as beyond Congress' Article I power to
regulate interstate commerce, and hinting that Congress' lack of commercial motivation was relevant
to the Court's conclusion).

44.

See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 900 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,

dissenting) (accusing majority of "Lochnerism" in questioning legitimacy of government purpose of
localism); cf. Morgan Cloud, The FourthAmendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy,Property,and
Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48.STAN. L. REV. 555 (1996) (arguing for a revival of Lochner era

methodology in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). See generally Gottlieb, supra note 33, at 975-77
(nothing the mistake during Lochner era was in how Constitution was interpreted, not necessarily in
methodology); Pildes, supranote 35, at 751 (discussing how rejection of Lochner era cases does not
require rejection of its general judicial method).
45. See Aleinikoff, supra note 33.
46. See Henkin, supra note 39.
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"balancing" in constitutional analysis.47 How does judicial "balancing" of individual rights against governmental or public interests fit
within the Court's current doctrinal framework? As described above,
that framework does not appear to contemplate any balancing in most
contexts.4 8 It is, however, clear that the Court does engage in balancing,
even in core individual rights cases; some results are explicable in no
other way.49

The best explanation for what the Court is doing in these cases may
lie in the metaphor of "weighted" balancing, or the "thumb on the
scale." When the Court adopts a heightened standard of review, it essentially increases the weight it gives to the individual interest, and so
requires a stronger governmental interest in order for the state to prevail. The amount of weight given to the individual right depends on the
severity of the scrutiny." However, this Article asserts that in certainthough not all-types of cases involving heightened scrutiny, the Court
does not, and moreover should not, engage in balancing at all. Instead,
it should utilize a stringent form of governmental purpose analysis."' In
part, the Court's recent acceptance of balancing is the result of its fail-

ure to develop a coherent framework for analyzing government interests. Absent such an analysis, the Court must accept the strength and
validity of most interests as proffered by the state. Such ready acceptance forces the Court into balancing if it is to vindicate individual
rights. While sometimes unstated, balancing is clearly one aspect of the
Court's current jurisprudence, and its use supports the notion that the
Court is generally reluctant to engage in purpose scrutiny.
47. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 124-28 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486
U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); Symposium, When Is a Line as Long as a Rock is
Heavy?: Reconciling Public Values and Individual Rights in Constitutional Adjudication,45 HASTINGS
LJ. 707 (1994).
48. I refer here to the three-tiered jurisprudence that dominates the individual rights area. In
other areas, such as the Fourth Amendment, the "negative Commerce Clause," and procedural Due
Process, the Court has explicitly adopted multi-factored balancing tests, so no reconciliation is
necessary. See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 963-70 (recounting the growth and spread of
interest balancing in constitutional cases).
49. See, e.g., Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 130 (1989) (striking down total
ban on indecent phone messages as not narrowly tailored, while implicitly conceding that other
methods could not be as effective at advancing the compelling interest of protecting children); Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding ban on sleeping in
Lafayette Park, despite fact that ban prevented planned demonstration by homeless advocates across
from White House); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding registration of only men for
draft even though classification was arguably not necessary to advance government interest).
50. See Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 984-85; Owen M. Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner, in
PuBLIc VALUES, supranote 34, at 195, 199-204; cf. Sager, supra note 35, at 930-32 (suggesting that
the tilted balancing metaphor is one understanding of the state-interest test, but is too narrow).
51. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing "limited purposes" review as an alternative to traditional
strict scrutiny).
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C. Purpose Scrutiny: Recent Developments in ConstitutionalLaw
Beginning in the early 1980s and accelerating in the past decade, a
new methodology has emerged at the borders of the Court's doctrinal
framework, and sometimes in apparent conflict with that framework.
This new methodology manifests a renewed interest in the previously
forbidden terrain of purpose scrutiny, including a new willingness to
examine, and pass independent judgment on, the reasons why the state
has chosen to burden individual rights. In other words, the Court is beginning to show a willingness, once again, to look at the why of state
action, not just the how. Moreover, in the very recent past, the forces
driving these decisions have begun to invade and undermine the Court's
general three-tiered scheme. This Section will discuss evidence of the
Court's new purpose scrutiny in the areas of equal protection and free
speech in particular, and in other areas in general. The Section will
conclude with an examination of recent academic commentary on the
nature of government purposes, and how courts should analyze those
purposes.
1.

Purpose Scrutiny in Equal ProtectionJurisprudence

The line of cases applying what has been called "rational basis with
bite"" may provide the clearest example of the Court's renewed interest
in government purposes. In these cases, all of which involved challenges to regulation under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
applied its lowest standard of scrutiny, the rational basis test, but
nonetheless struck down the regulations because it perceived that the
actual ends-as distinct from the proffered ends-motivating the legislation were illegitimate. 3 First, in a series of cases beginning in 1982,
the Court has struck down state statutes that grant benefits based on
distinctions between residents and non-residents, or among residents
based on the duration of their residency in the state. 4 The Court began
52. See Gunther, supra note 7, at 21; Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite:
IntermediateScrutiny by Any OtherName, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 800-03 (1987).
53. Another factor that may explain the outcome of these cases is the strength of the individual
right conferred by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams,

457 U.S. 55, 73-81 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
54. See Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618-23 (1985) (striking down New
Mexico law limiting tax benefits to Vietnam veterans based on date of residency); Williams v.
Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 21-27 (1985) (striking down Vermont foreign tax credit exemption limited to
those who were residents at time of payment); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 88283 (1985) (striking down Alabama tax on insurance premiums that taxed out-of-state insurers more
heavily than in-state); Zobel, 457 U.S. at 63 (striking down Alaska law distributing oil revenues based
on length of residency); cf.Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 909-12 (1986)
(striking down under strict scrutiny New York law denying civil service preference points to out-ofstate veterans, and finding certain governmental purposes impermissible, not merely not compelling);
Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 261-70 (1974) (applying strict scrutiny and
striking down law denying non-emergency medical care to indigents with less than one year of

1997]

PURPOSE SCRUTINY IN CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

313

analysis in these cases, naturally, by examining the means by which the
regulations were put into place-the particular classifications chosen by
the legislatures. It concluded that the classifications themselves did not
implicate a suspect class, and did not necessarily burden the fundamental right to "travel" or "migrate interstate."55 Despite the facial validity of the chosen means, the Court went on to examine the purposes
underlying the legislation, concluding that the only conceivable purposes of the statutes-to "favor[] established residents over new residents,"5 6 or to "reward citizens for past contributions"57 to the Statewere illegitimate. According to the Court, they were inconsistent with
the structure and purposes of the federal system established by the
Constitution.
The Court did not apply means scrutiny in these cases-there was
little question that the chosen means directly advanced whatever ends
the government was pursuing-and so the entire constitutional debate
centered on the ends that the states could legitimately pursue. The
Court's decisions in these cases can be contrasted with its opinion in
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 8 where it upheld California's Proposition 13
against an equal protection challenge. Proposition 13 had established
differing methods of property tax assessment for new and existing
homeowners, which resulted in widely disparate tax burdens among
homeowners. In particular, the initiative placed a disproportionate burden on recent immigrants into California. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the initiative because its underlying purposes-to preserve and
stabilize local neighborhoods and to protect the reliance interests of
long-time homeowners, especially poor ones, against sudden rises in
property taxes-were wholly legitimate and unrelated to any parochial
concerns. 9 Nordlingersupports the view that the Court's earlier decisions striking down state benefits regulations were actually examples of
purpose scrutiny, because the effects of Proposition 13 on new residents
were at least as burdensome as those created by the regulations previously invalidated.
Second, in at least two modem decisions, and one earlier decision,
the Court has struck down legislation that appeared to discriminate gratuitously against certain classes of citizens, even though it did not find
residency; finding certain governmental interests impermissible); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
631-34 (1969) (striking down one-year residency requirements to receive welfare; finding certain
interests impermissible before selecting standard of review).
55. See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634-37.
56. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 65 (quoting Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 450 (1973)) (internal

quotations omitted).
57.
58.

Id. at 63.
505 U.S. 1 (1992).

59.

See id. at 11-14.
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that the legislative classifications were "suspect."
Instead, in each of
these cases the Court found that the purpose driving the challenged legislation was "a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group
[that] cannot constitute a legitimate government interest" under the
Equal Protection Clause."' These cases represent an even larger fissure
within the Court's three-tiered system than the residency cases because
they find a particular governmental purpose-"punitive discrimination"61 -inherently impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause,
even if no suspect classification is involveds6 and if no other constitutional provision is even arguably implicated.63 And it is clear that these
decisions turn on the government's illegitimate purposes, because the
Court has often held that the mere disparate impact of a regulation on a
vulnerable group is not enough to render the regulation unconstitutional.6 The cases hold that the Equal Protection Clause does not simply constrain government from employing certain suspect

classifications; it renders classifications adopted because of animus toward the affected class unconstitutional.65
While this "rational basis with bite" review presents the clearest
example of the Court's newfound interest in purpose scrutiny, it is far
from the only example. In recent years, the Court has scrutinized government purposes in other equal protection cases, and has even looked
at purposes when it has employed higher levels of scrutiny. The most
60. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996) (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (internal quotations omitted) (striking down law placing special burdens on
homosexuals); see also City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985)
(striking down zoning ordinance restricting ability of mentally retarded to establish group homes);
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 (striking down Food Stamp Act provision denying benefits to households
containing "unrelated" people, on the grounds that motivation was animus); cf Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 216-30 (1982) (striking down Texas law denying free public education to children who are not
legal residents under an undefined form of heightened scrutiny seemingly based in part on a
perception that the law was partly motivated by irrational animus).
61. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 240 (Powell, J., concurring) (asserting that the challenged law is
unconstitutional because it embodies a form of "punitive discrimination").
62. But cf. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that animus against gays
and lesbians is not an illegitimate purpose because homosexuals are not a suspect class).
63. But cf. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 73-81 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV is the proper basis for the
Court's residency decisions).
64. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (upholding imposition
of fees for public school buses, despite impact on access of indigents to education, because neither
suspect class nor fundamental right was burdened); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 18 (1973); see also Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) ("The Constitution presumes
that, absent some reason to infer antipathy,even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by
the democratic process.") (emphasis added).
65. One question this raises is, of course, precisely what function suspect and semi-suspect
categories perform in the Court's jurisprudence. The answer seems to be that for historical reasons,
these classifications are so thoroughly associated with improper motives that they are presumed to be
unconstitutional, and will be permitted only in very special circumstances. See Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097,2117 (1995); see also infra Part II.B.1.
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notable examples of this trend are the Court's recent decisions on af-

firmative action. Beginning with its 1989 decision in City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co.,66 and culminating with the recent decision in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,67 the Court has held that all governmental uses of race-based classifications are subject to the strict scrutiny test, even when the classifications are clearly designed to benefit
minorities who have been subject to previous discrimination. But the
story does not end there-one by-product of the affirmative action decisions is an active debate over which government purposes qualify as
"compelling," and the beginnings of a jurisprudence that examines the

justifications behind benign racial classifications.68
This purpose-oriented jurisprudence represents a substantial shift

from the earlier cases dealing with race-based classifications that disadvantaged minorities. Since the discredited Korematsu decision, the
Court has never found any state interest sufficiently compelling to jus-

tify a race-based classification that disadvantaged minorities, and further
has strongly suggested that no such interest exists.69 In the affirmative
action context, however, it seems likely that some governmental purposes are "sufficiently compelling," although it is far from clear which

purposes qualify. With no sound analytic framework in place to help
them analyze and weigh government purposes, the Court has developed
an ad hoc jurisprudence that seems to reflect more the proclivities and
7
preferences of the decision maker than any constitutional principles. 1
66. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down city contracting program with 30% set-aside for
minority-owned contractors).
67. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (requiring all racial classifications to be analyzed under strict
scrutiny).
68. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, 115 S. Ct. at 2127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d
916,919-20 (7th Cir. 1996); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,948-55 (5th Cir. 1996).
69. See Adarand Constructors, 115 S. Ct. at 2136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)). For the textual origins of the term "strict scrutiny," and for an
example of a punitive race-based classification that survived Supreme Court review, see Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
70. See Adarand Constructors, 115 S. Ct. at 2110 (reading precedent to suggest that racial
classifications may be used to "eradicate the effects of private discrimination") (quoting City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,491-92 (1989)); id. at 2118-19 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (asserting that no interest is sufficiently compelling to justify a
racial classification); id. at 2127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that diversity remains a
government interest sufficient to support racial classifications); Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 612
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (remedying past discrimination is only compelling interest to support racial
classifications); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that providing minority role models for minority students is not a compelling interest); id.
at 316-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding such an interest consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (holding that racial or ethnic
diversity in an educational setting is a compelling interest); Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 919, 921 (finding
compelling interest supporting racial preference given to black candidate for lieutenant position in
"correctional boot camp," and rejecting as "unreasonable" view expressed in Hopwood and other
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The Court's interest in purpose scrutiny in the affirmative action context is clear, and probably inevitable given the Court's reluctance either
to embrace or to wholeheartedly condemn race-based remedies. Its
halting jurisprudence in this area, however, demonstrates that the Court
has yet to settle upon any clear methodology or defined principles to
guide its efforts at purpose scrutiny.
2. Purpose Scrutiny in Free Speech Jurisprudence
The Court's recent free speech jurisprudence likewise contains an
increased, though less explicit, attention to government purposes. This
attention is especially apparent in the Court's "content" jurisprudence,
where the Court's decision as to whether a given regulation is "contentbased" or "content-neutral" determines which tier of scrutiny will apply. As I have noted elsewhere, there is an inconsistent but recurring
tendency in the Court's content jurisprudence to define content-neutral
laws as those "justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech"-in other words, the question of whether a law is contentneutral or not depends on the purpose of the challenged law.7 On a
72 case described in the Introrelated note, in the Turner Broadcasting
duction, the Court split sharply over whether a regulation whose purpose
was to assure diversity among the viewpoints expressed in the media was
content-based, and indeed over whether such a purpose was even permissible, again demonstrating the increased importance of governmental
objectives in applying the Court's doctrine. 3 Other examples abound. 4
Together, these cases reveal an extraordinary doctrinal confusion over
cases that remedying past discrimination is only compelling interest); Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948, 951
(finding that only possible compelling interest is to remedy prior discrimination by the particular
governmental body that has adopted the racial classification).
71. Bhagwat, supra note 14, at 161-62 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)))
(internal quotations omitted); see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2523
(1994) ("We thus look to the government's purpose as the threshold consideration."); City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986); American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 8487 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Brownstein, supranote 23, at 922-23.
72. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
73. Compare Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470 (finding viewpoint diversity to be an
important government interest) with id. at 2477 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (concluding that any rule
geared toward ensuring diversity must be content-based and therefore constitutionally suspect).
74. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT 111), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(en bane) (disagreements between the majority and the dissent over what purposes the government
may pursue in regulating indecent speech), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996). For other discussions
of government purposes, see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (considering the
constitutionality of a statute forbidding political speech near a polling place in order to protect the
voting process); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (discussing the constitutionality of
criminalizing flag-burning for the purpose of preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (same). Taken together, these cases reveal a renewed judicial interest
in examining the governmental purposes underlying speech regulation. The sharp fissures that have
developed within the Court on this issue underscore the significance of this effort.
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the most basic questions underlying the Court's content jurisprudence,

and suggest that at least part of that confusion is related to the Court's
failure to develop an adequate framework to engage in purpose scrutiny.
Purpose analysis is also becoming more important in the area of
commercial speech regulation. In a number of recent commercial
speech cases-most notably, last Term's decision in 44 Liquormart75
discussed in the Introduction-the Court has suggested that creating or
maintaining public ignorance, even in pursuit of otherwise legitimate
ends, are inherently suspect, and perhaps automatically unconstitutional

purposes, because such aims violate fundamental First Amendment
principles.76 In these cases, as in the equal protection context, the Court
is moving away from the traditional three-tiered scrutiny, balancing
tests, and deference to legislative objectives of the Burger Court, and
toward a new form of purpose scrutiny.
3. Purpose Scrutiny in Other Areas
A focus on government purposes can be found in other areas of
individual-rights jurisprudence as well, although it is less prominent.
For example, after the recent Casey decision, there is some indication
that purpose scrutiny will play an increased role in the Court's abortion
jurisprudence and its application of the "undue burden" standard

75. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
76. Of particular interest in this regard is Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in 44 Liquormart,
which argues that an asserted governmental interest in maintaining consumer ignorance is per se
illegitimate. See id. at 1515-17 & n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Thomas traces this principle to a long line of commercial speech cases, beginning with
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,' 425 U.S. 748, 767-70
(1976), the Court's first modem commercial speech case. See 44 Liquormart,, 116 S. Ct. at 1516-17 &
n.2. It should be noted that the illegitimate purpose identified by the Court in these commercial
speech cases-producing ignorance to manipulate consumer choice-can be recharacterized as a
form of means analysis, ignorance being an improper means to the legitimate end of discouraging
vice. What this points out is that means and purposes can blur, depending on the level of generality
with which purposes are defined. This in turn suggests that in the Court's means scrutiny cases one
can find the kernels of an ends analysis, if one describes governmental purposes in appropriately
narrow terms. I am grateful to Michael Dorf for this insight.
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Furthermore, there is evidence of purpose

scrutiny in the free exercise of religion context as well.78
As the strict and intermediate scrutiny decisions discussed above
suggest, the Court has increasingly focused on government purposes
instead of merely examining legislative means in heightened-scrutiny

cases as well as in rational basis decisions. Although the Court may apply purpose scrutiny in both situations, the nature and focus of the
Court's inquiry in heightened-scrutiny cases differs from that accorded
under rational basis.79
4. Recent Academic Commentary on Purpose Analysis
The recent increased interest in purpose scrutiny has not been limited to the judiciary-the past few years have also seen increasing,
though still somewhat embryonic, academic commentary on the nature
of government interests and how courts should analyze those interests.
The pioneer in this area is Stephen Gottlieb, who in the last decade has
argued tirelessly for greater academic attention to the role of govern-

ment interests in the Court's constitutional jurisprudence."

Other than a

single student note,8 ' Gottlieb's 1988 article appears to have been the
first substantial examination of the theory underlying governmental interests, and he has played an important role in stimulating more recent
work in the area. Gottlieb's basic position-that valid governmental
interests, like individual constitutional rights, must be rooted in the con-

stitutional text-is certainly debatable, 82 but it has provided a starting
point for further discussion. Alexander Aleinikoff's important 1987
piece on constitutional balancing also touches on the topic of governmental purposes, although that is not the focus of the article.83

77. See Brownstein, supra note 23, at 939-42 (reading Casey as suggesting that laws with the
impermissible purpose of seeking to hinder exercise of the abortion right are per se unconstitutional);
Doff, supra note 18, at 1233-35 (stating that while Casey's language suggests that a law passed with
the purpose of slightly burdening the abortion right would be constitutional, that cannot be what the
Court actually meant); cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down statute prohibiting
distribution of contraception to unmarried persons under rational-basis review, but engaging in
searching scrutiny of actual legislative motives); Gunther, supra note 7, at 34-36 (suggesting that the
only explanation for the analysis in Eisenstadt was "a value-laden appraisal of the legitimacy of
ends"); Schneider, supra note 32, at 92 (arguing that Eisenstadt improperly defined and evaluated the
state interests at issue).
78. See Dorf, supra note 18, at 1240 (discussing Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990)).
79. How the ends scrutiny should and does differ in different arenas is discussed infra Part ll.B.
80. See, e.g., Gottlieb, supra note 34; Gottlieb, supra note 33; Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox
of Balancing Significant Interests, 45 HASTINos L.J. 825 (1994).
81. See Sobelsohn, supra note 33.
82. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Scholarship in the 1990s, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 1105,
1114-16 (1994) (reviewing PUaLIC VALUES, supra note 34).
83. See Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 947, 977 & n.214, 986.
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In the past few years, however, an important literature on government purposes and constitutional law has emerged. The Albany Law
Review held a symposium on the subject, which eventually turned into
an entire book edited by Stephen Gottlieb." Another symposium,
which focused largely on the topic, was organized by the Hastings Law
Journal.85 Most of the recent literature has focused on the validity of
particular governmental interests within specific areas of constitutional
law. 6 But there are exceptions, including Richard Pildes' work arguing
for a renewed focus on "excluded reasons" as a basis for constitutional
adjudication,87 and Richard Fallon's examination of the relationship
between individual rights and governmental powers.88 Across the spectrum, however, one central theme emerges from the literature: there is a
need for a principled theory of permissible and compelling governmental purposes, and the Supreme Court has failed to articulate such a
theory. The commentators also strongly suggest that the Court's recent
purpose analysis, without a unifying theory, has tended to be completely
ad hoc, and driven largely by political or social predilections. 9 Despite
these concerns, none of the commentators has articulated a more general approach to the questions of when and under what standards the
Court should employ purpose scrutiny, or of how the nature of purpose
scrutiny might vary across different areas of substantive constitutional
law. The remainder of this Article begins to sketch the outlines of such
a theory.
II
PURPOSE SCRUTINY: THEORY AND PRACTICE

This Part addresses the two obvious and difficult questions about
the workability of purpose scrutiny within our constitutional system.
First, can the Supreme Court develop a principled and effective purpose
84. See Gottlieb, supra note 34, at 2-3 (acknowledgements); Conference on Compelling
Government Interests: The Mystery of ConstitutionalAnalysis, 55 ALB. L REV. 535-761 (1992).
85. See Symposium, supra note 47.
86. Of particular note in this regard is Carl Schneider's work on government interests in the
privacy area. See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis and the Channeling Function in

PrivacyLaw, in PUBLIC VALUES, supra note 34, at 97, 99-109; Schneider, supranote 32, at 92-93; see
also Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First

Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L REV. 413, 443-505 (1996) (discussing role of government
purposes in free speech doctrine); Margaret Jane Radin, Government Interests and Takings: Cultural
Commitments of Propertyand the Role of Political Theory, in PUBLIC VALUES, supra note 34, at 69,

79-83 (discussing the evaluation of government interests in takings jurisprudence); Kate Stith, The
Government Interest in Criminal Law: Whose Interest Is It, Anyway?, in PUBLIC VALUES, supra note
34, at 137, 139 (addressing the role of government interests in criminal procedure jurisprudence).
87. See Pildes, supranote 35.
88. See Fallon, supranote 33.
89. See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, "Unfocused" Governmental Interests, in PUBLIC VALUES, supra
note 34, at 45, 58-59; Schneider, supra note 32, at 97-99.
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scrutiny that is grounded in the Constitution? Second and relatedly, is
purpose scrutiny consistent with the role of an unelected judiciary in
our constitutional system? 9' For purpose scrutiny to be meaningful, it
will have to be rigorous and consistently applied, but a rigorous purpose
scrutiny could easily slip into Lochner-esque overreaching. Nevertheless, I believe that a properly and adequately constrained purpose scrutiny is conceivable. Furthermore, if properly limited, purpose scrutiny
is a perfectly legitimate function for the judiciary. Finally, purpose
scrutiny has substantial potential to both cement doctrinal coherence
and further constitutional principles. The Supreme Court should therefore expand its recent focus on governmental purposes, adjusting its
doctrine to provide for a more meaningful scrutiny of governmental
objectives.
To be legitimate, purpose scrutiny must be principled and textually
based. First, a court engaging in purpose scrutiny should identify certain governmental purposes that are inherently illegitimate when advanced to justify burdens on particular individual rights. Second, it
should identify which purposes may be properly advanced to justify
actions that appear to directly infringe core constitutional rights. Third,
when neither an illegitimate purpose nor a core constitutional violation
appears to be present, the court should recognize the need for judicial
deference to democratically selected objectives.
As this proposed framework suggests, purpose scrutiny is not designed to give the judiciary a blank check to review all governmental
purposes based on a particular judge's notions of rationality or legitimacy; when a court lacks a specific, constitutional basis for employing
purpose scrutiny, the court should refrain. In addition, it remains a
threshold requirement for judicial scrutiny that a right be infringed in a
constitutionally meaningful sense by the challenged government action,9"' although an examination of how rights are defined and infringed
is well beyond the scope of this paper. 92 Even with these practical limitations, however, systematic judicial scrutiny of governmental purposes

90.

Of course, some state judiciaries are elected. But given the dominance of the federal

courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, in formulating constitutional law, the assumption that most
important constitutional law is made by democratically unaccountable judges seems reasonable.

91.

My position on this point appears to separate me from Alan Brownstein and Richard Pildes.

See Brownstein, supra note 23, at 939-42; Pildes, supranote 35, at 726-27. It should also be noted that
barriers to judicial review might arise quite independently from substantive doctrine, for example
from standing principles. However, I am concerned in this Article primarily with governmental
actions that infringe rights and harm individuals, not with actions that, while arguably violating
constitutional principles, do not cause direct injury to individuals-such as for example, certain
Establishment Clause violations, or violations of the separation of powers.
92. In this regard, Michael Dorf's recent work is extremely insightful, and I will be relying
upon it to a substantial extent. See Doff, supra note 18, at 1175.
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would have substantial consequences for constitutional law theory and
practice.
A. Problems of Competence and Legitimacy
It is an axiom of modem constitutional scholarship that, when
reviewing the actions of the democratically selected branches, the courts
are better suited to evaluation of the means by which governments
accomplish their purposes than the ends they choose to pursue. Gerald
Gunther articulated this position twenty-five years ago, 93 and other
scholars have made similar arguments.94 Indeed, this impulse appears to
underlie much of the modem criticism of judicial "balancing.""' The
reasoning underlying this conclusion is quite simple, and is tied to
Alexander Bickel's concept of the "counter-majoritarian difficulty. '"96
Simply put, the idea is that in a democracy, the choice of what ends
government should pursue, and the evaluation of the importance of
those ends, should be exercised by elected representatives.
Once this principle is accepted, the conclusion that courts have
neither the ability nor the right to second-guess legislatures (or elected
executive-branch officials) as to governmental objectives follows naturally. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court's three-tiered approach,
which in practice focuses principally on government means, seems to
accept this logic.' The Court has also seemed to accept Gunther's related argument that when courts engage in means scrutiny, they deal
with empirical and evidentiary issues well within their traditional sphere
of competence. 98 In contrast, when courts engage in purpose scrutiny,
they are not on such comfortable footing. 99 Any defense of a reinvigorated purpose scrutiny must therefore respond to the argument that
courts lack both the legitimacy and the competence to engage in scrutiny of legislative ends.
To begin with, the argument that courts lack the competence, as
opposed to the legitimacy, to engage in purpose scrutiny is highly suspect. One important assumption underlying the means-oriented position is that courts are somehow better at assessing the wisdom of the
93. See Gunther, supra note 7, at 20-24.
94. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 33, at 387-88; Sager, supranote 35, at 931-32; Schneider, supra
note 32, at 117; Sobelsohn, supra note 35 at 494; cf Gottlieb, supra note 33, at 966-69.
95. See Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 986; Henkin, supra note 39, at 1048.
96. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962) (coining term
"counter-majoritarian difficulty"); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 1-9 (1980); David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government
Interests: Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L REV. 1521, 1525-28
(1992).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 7-13.
98. See Gunther, supra note 7, at 20-22.
99. See id. at 24, 43.
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means chosen by a legislature than at assessing the ends. Another is that
means scrutiny is more "neutral" and less affected by value judgments
than purpose scrutiny. But commentators, including Gunther himself,
have noted that "tailoring" analysis, the Court's general label for
means scrutiny, is notoriously manipulable. In fact, the Court has manipulated means scrutiny with some frequency as a way of making implicit judgments about legislative ends."° Moreover, this is hardly
surprising; the kinds of factual and predictive judgments required for a
meaningful and non-arbitrary means scrutiny are extremely complex,
and far better suited to a legislative setting than a judicial one. For example, when a legislature chooses among different means to achieve a
given end, decisions must be made about the relative effectiveness and
cost of each option, and what other benefits and detriments, both political and practical, might be associated with each option. Indeed, to
evaluate accurately the wisdom of a particular choice of means, one
would need to know a great deal about the range of alternative means
that were available at the time the legislation at issue was enacted, including the expected effectiveness and costs of each of those options.
These kinds of choices, while perhaps resting at least partly on facts that
are in some sense "empirical," also require pervasive and fundamental
value judgments, which it is hardly clear that judges are competent to
make. Even the "empirical" issues underlying a choice of means are
not necessarily the kinds of facts courts are very good at "finding."
Courts are notoriously bad at evaluating legislative and constitutional
facts, '' and full knowledge regarding legislative options is in any event
extremely unlikely to be available in litigation. For these reasons,
Gunther's hope of a neutral and effective means scrutiny would be hard
to fulfill.
In contrast to the difficulty of locating and evaluating empirical
evidence about means, information about legislative ends and purposes
is often far more accessible. After all, it is not particularly difficult to
make reasonable judgments about the motivations behind legislation in
most cases. Statutory text and structure, legislative history, and an examination of political context provide strong and generally adequate
tools with which to make these determinations. In fact, as Richard Pildes
points out, evaluating legislative purposes may be what courts are best

100. See Schneider, supra note 32, at 89-92 (cataloging problems with Court's means analysis);
see also Gunther, supra note 7, at 33-36 (pointing out that Court's rigorous means analysis in both
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), seemed to mask
some underlying hostility to the challenged legislation in each case).

101.

For a general discussion of the Supreme Court's (mis)handling of empirical issues in

constitutional adjudication, see David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding":
Exploring the EmpiricalComponent of ConstitutionalInterpretation,139 U. PA. L REV. 541 (1991).
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suited to do, given their typical training and expertise.
Naturally, this
discussion raises the broader question of whether legislative purpose is
ever definable in a meaningful sense, since the hidden motivations of
legislators are rarely known, and because attributing one defined
"intent" to a multi-member body is necessarily a fictitious enterprise.
Although the resolution of this important question is beyond the scope
of this Article, I am inclined to agree that while of course legislative
purpose is to some degree a fictional concept, the process of attributing
purposes to the actions of lawmaking bodies is implicit in the legal
method. In other words, the legal community has agreed upon a series
of conventions and techniques through which we construct a narrative
account of "legislative intent" or purpose, and though naturally there
are close cases, the process produces a reasonably consistent account in
most cases.'0 3 Also, the fact that the actual legislative purpose in any
given case may be a matter of dispute does not strike me as a particularly powerful objection to purpose scrutiny; it is true that purpose
scrutiny will continue to require the exercise of judicial judgment, but
that is what judging is all about. Only the most ardent supporter of
''neutral principles" would believe that the need to make some difficult
judgments in close cases constitutes a significant objection to a theory
of constitutional adjudication.
This of course leaves the problem of legitimacy--even if courts
can define and evaluate legislative purposes, should they? Here, many
of the objections to judicial purpose scrutiny are well-founded. It is
quite true that assessing the strength of government interests and then
choosing which interests to pursue is a quintessentially legislative task.
Ad hoc reweighing of such legislative judgments by the judiciary is
highly problematic. But this is precisely the kind of analysis that the
upper tiers of the current three-tiered system appear to contemplate,
through the language of "compelling" and "important" government
interests. In practice, of course, courts have been understandably
reticent about exercising their claimed authority in this regard,"° and
have focused primarily on the means by which government action is

102. See Pildes, supra note 35, at 729 n.45 (citing Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (1) CrS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial
State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1872 (1987)).
103. For an excellent exposition of this position, see Radin, supra note 86, at 79-83; see also
Pildes, supra note 35, at 729 n.45; Sheppard, supra note 33, 984-85 & nn.50-51. See generally
RONALD DWORIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 49-53, 313-17 (1986). For a somewhat different, but related
approach to motive analysis that emphasizes somewhat the difficulty of identifying legislative
motives, see Kagan, supra note 86, at 439-41. Finally, for a more sanguine view of the Court's ability

to identify invidious purposes, see JESSE H.

CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES

FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES

104.

See supra text accompanying notes 8-13.

52-53 (1995).
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accomplished. Nevertheless, even the possibility of such review may
undermine democratic principles.

Moreover, even beyond the basic legitimacy issue, there are enormous practical difficulties with plenary judicial reweighing of government interests, because the possible universe of governmental purposes
is essentially infinite. It is therefore difficult to imagine any consistent
"theory of the state" that could be used to explain, and evaluate, every
single one of these purposes.'
The basically unlimited scope of valid
government purposes flows naturally from the broad modern understanding of the "police powers" of the states,'es the extraordinarily
broad range of federal government powers after the New Deal,"' and the

absence of limits on which objectives Congress may pursue through the
use of those powers.1" 8 The critical consequence of the broad scope of
government power is that when the judiciary seeks to reevaluate a cho-

sen legislative purpose, it has no basis upon which to conduct such an
evaluation other than the political instincts of the deciding judge-and
that, of course, is anathema to democratic theory."° The problem of
how to construct a legitimating theory of purpose scrutiny is therefore a
real and serious one.
To a substantial extent, this argument parallels the traditional,
Bickelian argument against assertive judicial review because of the

counter-majoritarian difficulty,"' an argument with which, at the broadest level, I agree. Ultimately, judicial review must be somewhat constrained if it is not to undermine democracy, and ad hoc and plenary
judicial second-guessing of legislative policy judgments is entirely un105. See Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 947, 977; David L. Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality
Transactionally,45 HASTINGS LJ. 753, 757-58 (1994); Fallon, supra note 33, at 348-51; Sheppard,
supranote 33, at 983-84; Stith, supranote 86, at 141-143.
106. See Fallon, supra note 33, at 350-51. For a history of the state police power, challenging the
view that the "modem" police power represents an expansion of state authority, see William J.
Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Originsof State Power in America, 45 HAsT'rs L.J. 1061 (1994).
107. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (upholding Congress' power to
regulate home-grown wheat); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (upholding Congress'
authority to regulate wages and hours of workers producing goods shipped in interstate commerce);
see also Doff, supra note 18, at 1192-94. But see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634
(1995) (striking down federal legislation banning possession of a handgun in a school zone as beyond
Congress' Article I power).
108. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987) (upholding federal regulation of the
legal drinking age pursuant to spending power); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (upholding federal regulation of racial discrimination under commerce power);
Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 363-64 (1903) (upholding federal regulation of
lottery tickets under commerce power).
109. One consequence of accepting a generally unlimited scope of permissible governmental
objectives is that, unlike Stephen Gottlieb and Kate Stith, I do not believe that governmental interests
in constitutional adjudication can, or must, be derived exclusively from the Constitution. But see
Gottlieb, supranote 33, at 937; Stith, supra note 86, at 143-45. Rather, the source of these interests is
in most instances the will of the majority. See Chemerinsky, supra note 82, at 1114-16,
110. See BICKEL, supra note 96, at 16.
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acceptable. But these largely uncontroversial principles need not doom
all judicial review, or even all judicial review of legislative purposes.
More importantly, they need not even limit purpose scrutiny to the few
areas-such as anti-discrimination or voting rights law-where the need
for representation reinforcement renders the general assumption of deference to democratic institutions less compelling."' Such a narrow approach would severely weaken the protections granted by the Bill of
Rights and the Civil War Amendments. Moreover, it is not necessary to
retain judicial legitimacy. Instead, what Bickelian principles do require
is that any searching, judicial review of legislative purposes must be
meaningfully constrained by and grounded in the Constitution itselfthe one source of authority that properly trumps the decisions of democratically elected bodies."' This point is not controversial, but it has important implications for the construction of a coherent framework for
purpose scrutiny. This Article now turns to that practical question.
B. Purpose Scrutiny in Practice:A Proposed Framework
As the previous discussion demonstrates, purpose scrutiny has been
an increasingly common element of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence, especially over the past decade. Even as it employs purpose
scrutiny, however, the Court has never offered any systematic explanation of the principles that guide its assessment of "government interests." These facts suggest that although a theory of purpose scrutiny
needs to be constructed, it need not and should not be constructed in a
vacuum. Instead, the theory should explain the Court's existing case
law, at least to some degree, and construct a harmonizing framework to
guide future analysis.
Construction should begin, then, with an examination of patterns in
the Court's current doctrine and jurisprudence, and some patterns do
emerge. Most importantly, the cases suggest that the Court has been
engaging in three quite distinct forms of purpose scrutiny, depending
on the type of case. Of course, without a coherent underlying theory
the Court has not always been clear about which type of purpose scrutiny it is pursuing in each instance. First, the Court has held that some
government purposes are simply not legitimate. This type of analysis
has long been implicit in the Court's doctrine, because its rational basis
test requires that a government action be "rationally related" to a
111.

See ELY, supra note 96, at 86-88 (describing the need for "representation reinforcing");

see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
112. This contention, of course, essentially tracks the argument made by Alexander Hamilton in
his defense of judicial review. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). It also faces the
same objections. The task of the remainder of this Article is to (hopefully) address some of those
objections. For a discussion, in the First Amendment context, of why government motive might matter
independent of the effects of a challenged regulation, see Kagan, supra note 86, at 511.
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"legitimate" government purpose. In practice, however, this principle
has not been limited to cases employing the rational basis test, and has
found serious expression only recently. Second, and primarily in cases
where a party alleges a direct burden on a core constitutional right, the
Court has been willing to accept only particular, specified governmental
purposes as adequate to justify government action. This tendency has
been made explicit in certain equal protection cases, but it lurks elsewhere as well. Finally, in the remainder of cases, where the government's purposes are not improper, and the Court has no basis to limit
the universe of permitted public purposes, the Court has struggled. It
has not yet identified the difficult questions that arise in this context,
much less formulated an approach. It is in these cases that the problem
of legitimacy-the counter-majoritarian difficulty-is at its height, and
therefore that the need for judicial deference to legislative or executive
judgments regarding the importance of governmental purposes is at its
greatest. The Court has occasionally hinted at an explicitly deferential
approach to purpose scrutiny-indeed, that has been the Court's tendency throughout the post-New Deal period 3 -but it has failed to
identify when deference is appropriate and when it is not.
There is an obvious symmetry between the three types of purpose
scrutiny that I have identified and the three tiers of the Court's current
doctrine." 4 There are, however, important differences between the current tiers and the above-described framework for purpose scrutiny.
Notably, the categories of cases are not identical, meaning that the basis
upon which the Court currently categorizes cases is not identical to the
analytic framework necessary for systematic purpose scrutiny. Even
more fundamentally, the current doctrine simply does not explain how
legislative ends are to be evaluated, beyond describing the requirements
that they be "legitimate," "important," or "compelling." These differences exist because the current doctrine and tiers were not really designed with scrutiny of governmental purposes in mind, operating
instead primarily as vehicles for the evaluation of neans."5 For the
same reason, on the rare occasions when the Court does scrutinize purposes, it tends to do so on an essentially ad hoc basis. An evolution of
the current doctrinal tiers into the categories I describe here would alleviate that problem, and bring order to the case law. I should reiterate,
however, that no analysis, including the framework I propose, can provide precise answers to all difficult questions. Indeed, the search for a
113. See cases cited supra note 34.
114. Indeed, one might expect that if the Court's formal doctrine begins to take explicit account
of purpose scrutiny and the framework I set forth above, it would be through the evolution of its
existing "tiers."
115. See supra text accompanying notes 8-13.
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universal "test" is partly responsible for the current doctrine's disarray.
What I present here is a broad and hopefully useful framework, but actual analysis must proceed right-by-right and case-by-case.
1. Illegitimate-PurposeAnalysis
a. Examples from Recent Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court's three-tiered system has long suggested that
all government action must at least be rationally related to a legitimate
government interest, even if the action is not subject to any heightened
scrutiny." 6 In practice, however, that requirement has largely been ignored in the post-New Deal era. The latter half of that formulation has
been particularly toothless, imposing no meaningful constraint on governmental purposes."' Recently, however, the Court's constitutional
jurisprudence-especially in the areas of equal protection and free
speech-has revealed a renewed attention to the legitimacy of governmental purposes, including some consideration of how legitimacy is to
be determined by the judiciary. In the equal protection context, starting
with the 1973 Moreno"' decision, and continuing with Cleburne" 9 in
1985 and Romer v. Evans 2 ' this past Term, the Court has struck down
non-suspect legislative classifications on the grounds that the legislative
purpose of "harm[ing] a politically unpopular group" is incompatible
with the Equal Protection Clause.'
Similarly, in a series of cases involving interstate migration and residency requirements, the Court has
found that state legislation favoring residents or long-time residents of
that state is generally motivated by either of two purposes-favoring
established residents over new residents, or rewarding residents for past
contributions to the state-both of which are wholly improper.2 2 These
cases, which have been categorized as applying "rational basis review
with a-bite," are difficult to explain as anything but cases examining the
legitimacy of government purposes.
Although it is not as explicitly stated, the same trend can be seen in
other doctrinal areas, notably the Court's free speech jurisprudence. In
a series of commercial speech cases culminating in last Term's

116. See supra Part I.A.1; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 16-2, at 1439-43 (2d ed. 1988).
117. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976) (per curiam); Williamson
v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955); TRIBE, supra note 116, § 16-2, at 1440-41; Fallon,
supranote 33, at 348-51.
118. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
119. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985).
120. 116S. Ct. 1620, 1628-29 (1996).
121. See supra Part I.C.I.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
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44 Liquormart'" decision, the Court seems to have adopted a general

principle that a speech regulation passed with the purpose of keeping
consumers ignorant is per se invalid, because it lacks a legitimate purpose, even if the government's ultimate objective is to discourage or
control activity that it concededly has the power to regulate.2 4 In addition, and more significantly, the Court has identified a principle that
speech regulations passed for the purpose of suppressing the speaker's
message are inherently invalid.' 5 In several cases, including the flagburning cases and the Simon & Schuster"6 case, the Court has struck
down a regulation with minimal analysis because it believed the regula-

tion was motivated by hostility to the regulated speech.'27 This same
principle may also explain the Court's long-standing "hostile audience" decisions, which severely limit the ability of the State to restrict
speech because of the potentially violent reaction of listeners-the connection being that such laws, either facially or as applied, are often motivated by hostility to the message of the speaker.'
It is important to note that although many of the above cases were
analyzed under "strict scrutiny" because the challenged legislation was
found to be "content-based," this categorization appears to have added
little or nothing to the analysis-except in the thoroughly circular sense
that "content-based" regulation is sometimes defined as regulation
premised on hostility to a message. Once the Court found the legislation to be improperly motivated by ideological hostility to the speaker's
message, the possibility that it would be upheld was essentially nil. The
123. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1508-09 (1996).
124. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 643-46 (1985); Bolger
v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983); Linmark Associates. v. Willingboro
Township, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977).
125. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989);
see also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2351
(1995); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992).
126. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105
(1991).
127. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121-23; Eichman, 496 U.S. at 317-19; Johnson, 491 U.S.
at 414-20.
128. For an excellent discussion of the hostile audience cases, and the motive analysis underlying
them, see Kagan, supra note 86, at 461-64. The R.A.V. decision, striking down a municipal hatecrime ordinance that targeted "fighting words," is probably best explained by the hostile audience
principle. Justice Scalia's majority opinion seems entirely premised on the proposition that the
ordinance was motivated by hostility to bigoted speech, and that such hostility is improper. See
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386, 389-90, 396. The cursory means analysis of the majority opinion, which is
thoroughly discredited by the concurring Justices, effectively highlights the crucial role of purpose
analysis in the decision. Compare id. at 395-96 (majority opinion) with id. at 403-05 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Of course, the Court's basic conclusion, that the ordinance was
motivated by hostility to the message, as opposed to a desire to alleviate the special harms caused by
hate speech, is open to question. See id. at 432-34 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). R.A.V.
presents one of those "hard cases" where, even under purpose scrutiny, determining the true,
predominant purpose behind the ordinance is a difficult and controversial task.
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sole purpose of the "content" analysis in these cases appears to have
' Indeed, as disbeen to identify the nature of the legislative purpose. 29

cussed above, there has been a tendency in the Court's cases, albeit a
hesitant one, to convert the "content" analysis of its First Amendment
doctrine into a search for improper purposes.3 0 Of course, if used in

that manner, content analysis is no longer a mere means of categorization, a threshold that must be met for strict scrutiny to be applied. Instead, it is a search for illegitimate purposes, leading to automatic

invalidation. Furthermore, content analysis is a roundabout and fairly
ineffective way to smoke out improper purposes, and its use in this

manner has led to substantial confusion in the Court's analysis.3

The search for improper purposes in the Court's jurisprudence

extends beyond equal protection and free speech, to other constitutional
rights as well. In the abortion context, for example, it seems widely
accepted that under the Court's Casey decision, legislation passed solely
for the purpose of burdening a woman's abortion right is unconstitutional. 32 Similarly, it seems clear that, in the free exercise of religion
area, despite the language of strict scrutiny, legislation passed for the
purpose of hindering religious exercise is flatly unconstitutional,
because it has no legitimate purpose, much less the "compelling" one
strict scrutiny requires.133 This understanding of the Court's free exercise jurisprudence as driven in part by a search for illegitimate purposes
is consistent with, and indeed supported by, the Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith. 134 In Smith, the Court held that laws that
are neutral and of general applicability do not implicate the free
exercise clause because a law of general application is presumably not
improperly motivated, even if it does have the effect of burdening
religious exercise.'3 5 Finally, the search for illegitimate governmental
129. A particularly good example of such an analysis is Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315-19, in which
the Court analyzed the purposes of the federal flag-burning statute as tied to hostility to the message
conveyed, and then struck down the law with no further analysis.
130. See supra Part I.C.2.
131. For example, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2458-64 (1994),
and in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-49 (1986), the Court declined to
categorize as "content-based" legislation that appeared to be so, because of the apparent lack of an
improper purpose, and in Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992), the Court upheld legislation it
did classify as content-based, again because the governmental purpose was quite clearly not
illegitimate; see also id. at 211-14 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding that strict scrutiny in this case
serves the function of ensuring that no improper purpose exists). See discussion infra Part III.B.
132. See Brownstein, supra note 23, at 939-42; Dorf, supra note 18, at 1233-35.
133. See Church of Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542-48 (1993)
(finding asserted government interests inadequate because the legislation is targeted only at religion,
and therefore does not advance those interests neutrally).
134. 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
135. See id. at 878-79. Of course, this need not lead to the conclusion that such a law creates no
free exercise issues, as the Court held in Smith; rather it could just as easily suggest, and in my view
does suggest, the need for balancing. Restoring a balancing test is presumably the purpose of the
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purposes is, and has been for a long time, a central part of the Court's
establishment clause jurisprudence, which requires that a law have a
secular purpose if it is to be found constitutional.' 36
b. Methodological Lessons: Measuring Legitimacy Against
ParticularConstitutionalRights
Several important lessons can be drawn from the Court's recent
jurisprudence. First and foremost, when the case requires it to do so the
Court is willing and able to identify the true purpose behind challenged
legislation, 3 7 and to determine the legitimacy of that purpose. Also, to
avoid the counter-majoritarian difficulty, the Court will look to constitutional principles in determining legitimacy. The Court has therefore
turned to constitutional interpretation to identify the core principles underlying relevant individual-rights provisions. These principles, in turn,
suggest that certain types of government actions cannot be taken for
certain purposes. For example, classifications among citizens cannot be
adopted because of animus toward a particular unpopular groupevidence of an anti-caste principle the Court has found in the Equal
Protection Clause.'
Also, classifications among state residents cannot
be adopted for the purpose of favoring long-time residents or local
business at the expense of the national economy-evidence of an anti-

parochialism principle that the Court has also found (though with less
obvious historical and textual support) in the Equal Protection Clause.3 9
Speech, even of the commercial variety, cannot be regulated for the
purpose of keeping citizens ignorant-evidence of an anti-ignorance
principle the Court has found in the First Amendment's Free Speech
Clause." Nor may the government regulate private speech because of
its hostility to the message communicated-evidence of an anticongressional legislation reversing the result in Smith. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb).
136. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-91 (1987); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968).
137. See United States v. Virginia (VMI), 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2277 (1996) (Court will inquire into
"actual state purposes" in assessing constitutionality of gender classifications); Edwards, 482 U.S. at
586-87 (Court will look beneath stated secular purpose to ensure no religious motivation). But see
VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2289 n.*** (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in judgment) (refusing to conclude that the
state's exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute was improperly motivated, despite
finding that the proffered reason, diversity in education, was not the real reason for the action).
138. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle,92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994).
139. It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider whether the anti-parochialism principle
relied upon by the Court in these cases, which appears to be more rooted in principles of federalism
and national unity than equal protection, is properly found in the Fourteenth Amendment, though I
admit to serious doubts on the subject. The point, for my purposes, is that the Court has indeed found
and applied such a principle in equal protection cases.

140.
(1984).

See

MELVILLE

B.

NiMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH

§ 2.05, at 2-32 to -37
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orthodoxy principle the Court has also found in the First Amendment. 4
More generally, the government may not act for the purpose of preventing or hindering the exercise of a constitutional right' 4 2-a principle
that seems uncontroversial, and that the Court has located separately in
the substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights. Each of these constitutional principles has been understood to make illegitimate a class of
government purposes.
A second and related key lesson in the Court's recent case law is
that the legitimacy of governmental purposes varies with the right at
issue-meaning that a particular government purpose might be entirely
legitimate when one right is being burdened, and yet illegitimate in another context. This conclusion would seem to follow logically from the
fact that purpose scrutiny requires constitutional interpretation; when
the Free Speech Clause is being interpreted, one would naturally expect
different constitutional principles to emerge than from the Equal
Protection or Due Process Clauses. 43 In practice, however, this point has
been more controversial, and it has important implications for constitutional analysis, because it dictates whether the Court's analysis of
government interests can be imported across doctrinal areas. The
disagreement between the majority and dissenting opinions in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward'" illustrates this point well. In
Metropolitan Life, the Court was faced with an equal protection
challenge to an Alabama law that taxed out-of-state insurers at a higher
rate than domestic insurers. The majority struck down the statute,
finding that the state's asserted interest in promoting local industry was
illegitimate under the Equal Protection Clause and its anti-parochialism
principle. The Court reached this conclusion even though it had previously found the same purpose to be legitimate when resolving a dormant Commerce Clause issue, because the Equal Protection Clause and
the Commerce Clause serve different purposes. 45 Justice O'Connor's
141. For a detailed discussion of the anti-orthodoxy principle and its role in the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence, see Kagan, supra note 86, at 428-37. Kagan argues that most, if not all,
of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence can be explained as being grounded in a concern about
impermissible motives. Clearly, I do not agree with all of her conclusions. Much of her description
of the role of motive analysis in the Court's doctrine, however, is compelling.
142. See Sheppard, supra note 33, at 989; cf Brownstein, supra note 23, at 936.
143. My argument here is similar, but not identical, to Richard Pildes' position that constitutional
analysis often turns on the discovery of "excluded reasons," within particular "spheres of activity,"
and that constitutional rights are the tool by which we define those "spheres." See Pildes, supra note
35, at 720-25. Where I differ from Pildes most sharply is that in my view the critical factor that
triggers, and defines the contours of, purpose scrutiny is government action burdening a constitutional
right. Pildes, on the other hand, appears to take the position that individual harm is largely irrelevant
to the structural constitutional analysis described above. See id. at 726-27.
144. 470 U.S. 869 (1985).

145.

See id. at 876 n.6 ("The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast [to the Commerce Clause], is

concerned with whether a state purpose is impermissibly discriminatory."); id. at 881 ("The two
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dissenting opinion sharply disagreed with this analysis, arguing as
follows:
[T]he majority suggests that a state purpose might be legitimate
for purposes of the Commerce Clause but somehow illegitimate
for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. No basis is advanced for this theory because no basis exists. The test of a legitimate state purpose must be whether it addresses valid state
concerns. To suggest that the purpose's legitimacy, chameleonlike, changes according to the constitutional clause cited in the
complaint is merely another pretext to escape the clear message
of this Court's precedents.'46
This argument is facially appealing, and Justice O'Connor fairly
accuses the majority of not explaining its reasoning terribly well.
Nonetheless, on this point (though perhaps not in its ultimate conclusion) the majority is clearly correct, both in theory and on the basis of
the Court's precedents. The dissent's claim that the "test of legitimacy" is whether the statute "addresses valid state concerns" cannot be
correct-this would have reviewing courts deciding what state concerns
are "valid" as an abstract matter, without reference to constitutional
provisions. It would encourage judges to make ungrounded value
judgments without reference to the constitutional text, and thus would
raise the counter-majoritarian difficulty in its strongest form. Legitimacy therefore must be a function of constitutional analysis, in that a
purpose can be found illegitimate, at least as a matter of judicial decision, only if it runs afoul of a specific constitutional provision. If that is
the case, different constitutional provisions will invalidate different governmental purposes.
The dependence of purpose scrutiny on the constitutional provision at issue is well illustrated by the Court's decisions in its recent flagburning cases, Texas v. Johnson'47 and United States v. Eichman 4" Although the Court used the language of strict scrutiny, these cases are
clearly about illegitimate purposes. In these cases, the government's
asserted interest was preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity.
The Court found this purpose to be illegitimate because it was inextricably tied to hostility to the message conveyed by flag desecration, and
therefore contravened the anti-orthodoxy principle of the Free Speech

constitutional provisions perform different functions

..

. -one protects interstate commerce, and the

other protects persons from unconstitutional discrimination by the States.") (footnote omitted).
146. Id. at 895 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor goes on to accuse the majority of
Lochnerism, presumably because of its willingness to second-guess the judgment of the legislature.

See id. at 900.
147.
148.

491 U.S. 397 (1989).
496 U.S. 310(1990).
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Clause.'49 Indeed, when the Court struck the laws down, it did not concem itself in any serious way with "compelling interests" or "narrow
tailoring." Once the Court found that the basic purpose behind the
legislation violated First Amendment principles, its analysis was essentially concluded-there was no need for "balancing" or other types of
scrutiny. 5 A critical point to note, however, is that there is obviously
nothing inherently illegitimate about fostering the symbolic significance
of the American flag-as the Court acknowledges.'
Congress did not
violate the Constitution by designating June 14 as Flag Day. When the
Court found such a purpose illegitimate, therefore, it must have found
the purpose illegitimate only within the First Amendment context. In
other words, the purpose was illegitimate only when advanced as a justification to regulate or forbid speech, because such regulation sought to
create an "orthodoxy" through coercion of speech.
The Court's recent "cross-burning" decision, R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul,'52 illustrates the same point. There, the majority struck down a
municipal hate-speech ordinance because it was improperly motivated
by hostility to the message conveyed by hate speech. However, there is
surely nothing improper about governmental hostility to bigotryindeed, the Equal Protection Clause would appear to require such hostility. It is only in the context of regulating speech that such hostility
becomes improper. I should note again'53 that it is far from clear that
the R.A.V. ordinance was motivated by such hostility, but once the majority concluded that it was, invalidation followed naturally.
Another, more recent example of purpose scrutiny tied to a specific
constitutional provision is Romer v. Evans,'54 the recent decision striking
down a Colorado constitutional amendment that stripped gays and lesbians of legal protections, on the grounds that the provision was motivated solely by animus and therefore lacked any legitimate purpose.
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion echoed Justice O'Connor's dissent in
the Metropolitan Life case. He argued that because the Court's earlier
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick 56 had upheld a Georgia anti-sodomy
law against a substantive due process/right to privacy attack, hostility to
homosexuality and homosexuals could never be an illegitimate purpose. 57 Although the majority did not respond directly to this point, its
149. See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315-19; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410-19.
150. See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315-18; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410-20.
151. See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 318; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 418 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405,412 (1974)).
152. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
153. See supra note 128.
154. 116S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
155. See id. at 1628-29.
156. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
157. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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implicit response is clear: although animus may not violite privacy
principles when it is the basis for regulation of conduct, the same animus does violate equal protection principles when it is the motivation
behind legislation creating "'classes among citizens."""t These and
other decisions illustrate a crucial point: the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a governmental purpose is not an absolute quantity. Instead, it varies
depending on the constitutional right that the challenged governmental
action is alleged to violate. Legitimacy must be assessed based on principles that underlie that right, which can only be derived by interpreting
the relevant constitutional provisions.'59
There will, of course, be hard cases, where the relevant government
purposes and constitutional principles will be difficult to discern, and
therefore the legitimacy of the government's interest will be unclear.
One example of such a hard case is Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.," ° in
which the Court was faced with a First Amendment challenge to an
Indiana public indecency statute, as applied to nude dancing within a
private club. The plurality conceded that nude dancing was "expressive
conduct" within the perimeter of First Amendment protection, but
nevertheless found the purpose behind the statute-protecting societal
order and morality-to be legitimate, and therefore rejected the constitutional challenge under minimal scrutiny. 6' In dissent, Justice White
argued that the state's purpose was illegitimate, at least as applied in the
particular case, because it was rooted in hostility to the message conveyed by nude dancing, and therefore concluded that the statute, as
applied to private nude dancing, was unconstitutional. 62
In this
exchange, both the plurality and the dissent appeared to agree that the
purpose behind the challenged action was critical to the constitutional
158. Id. at 1623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion)); cf
Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientationand the Constitution:A Note on the Relationship Between Due
Processand Equal Protection, 55 U. Cmi. L. Rev. 1161 (1988) (arguing that because of the different
history and purposes of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the Bowers decision need not
foreclose the possibility that sexual orientation is a suspect classification for equal protection
purposes).
159. It may be that there are certain purposes that are always illegitimate, regardless of the
particular constitutional challenge. This does not seem to be an important possibility, however,

because in general, the illegitimacy of such a purpose is likely to derive from a particular provisionfor example, legislation motivated by hostility to African Americans is always illegitimate under equal
protection principles, and, in practice, a challenge to such legislation will almost certainly be
premised on the Equal Protection Clause. Describing this principle as "universal" in some sense does
not seem to advance the analysis much.
160. 501 U.S. 560(1991).

161.

See id. at 567-72. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Barnes majority, notes that

"public indecency statutes were designed to protect morals and public order.... This interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression." Id. at 569-70.
162. See id.at 590-94 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White's response to the majority notes that
"[t]he purpose of the proscription in these contexts is to protect the viewers from what the State
believes is the harmful message that nude dancing communicates." Id. at 591.
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analysis, and also appeared to agree that the purpose should be tested
against principles of free expression, which forbid regulation of speech
because of hostility to the speaker's message-i.e., for the purpose of
fostering an "orthodoxy." Where they disagreed was in the identification of the purpose behind the regulation. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who authored the plurality opinion, saw the issue as "morality." Justice
White saw it as hostility to the speaker's message.
Regardless of who was correct, the Barnes opinions illustrate that
even when the Court is asking the right questions, it may still be difficult
to reliably locate the actual purpose behind a given government action.
The R.A.V. decision, discussed above, illustrates the same point. And
the potential difficulties do not end there. Even when a government
purpose has been identified, and the Court's purpose scrutiny is properly tied to a constitutional provision, interpretation can be a difficult
and ambiguous process. In Romer v. Evans, the majority and dissent
essentially agreed that the legislation at issue was motivated by animus
toward gays and lesbians, and yet sharply disagreed over whether the
Equal Protection Clause forbade such animus.'63 Obviously, this issue
can be resolved only by determining what judicially enforceable principles the Equal Protection Clause enacts. The dissent's view appears to
be that the clause prohibits only animus against protected classes, while
the majority takes the position that the clause imposes a broader prohibition against creating "classes among citizens." The correct position
is not immediately clear from the text or history of the Fourteenth
Amendment; a difficult process of interpretation is inevitable."
Another illustration of the close relationship between the definition
of a right and the legitimacy of government purposes can be found in
the Court's abortion jurisprudence, including the majority opinion in
Roe v. Wade. 65 In Roe, the Court first found that women possess a constitutional privacy right to choose an abortion.'66 Then, with essentially
no analysis, the Court identified two "compelling" state interestsprotecting the health of the mother after the first trimester, and protecting the "potential life" of the fetus after the point of viability.67 What
163. Compare Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627-29 (finding animus toward homosexuals to be an
illegitimate motivation for legislation) with id. at 1629-37 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that hostility

toward homosexuals is not an improper legislative motivation because the state may forbid
homosexual conduct).

164.

As is probably evident, I am quite convinced that the majority's view is the better one, both

because the broad language of the Fourteenth Amendment appears to me to adopt a much broader
principle than the narrow protections envisioned by the dissent, and because a broader anti-caste
principle seems more consistent with democratic norms. The issue is, however, obviously beyond the
scope of this Article.
165. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
166. See id. at 154.
167. See id. at 162-63; see also Schneider, supra note 32, at 93-94.
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is thoroughly unclear from the opinion, however, is why the interest in
potential life is not "compelling" prior to viability, or, for that matter,
why the interest in maternal health springs into being only after one
trimester. Similarly, in its most recent abortion decision, Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey, 6 ' the Court appeared to hold that even though the
state has a legitimate interest in potential life throughout pregnancy, the
state may not seek to hinder the exercise of the abortion right prior to
viability, although it may seek to ensure that the decision is an
"informed" one.
These seemingly conflicting statements can be harmonized if one
recognizes that the strength and legitimacy of a purported state interest
in fetal life must be determined in light of the same constitutional principles that underlie and define the scope of the abortion right itself.,69
In other words, the same interpretive process 70 must guide both analyses. If we assume that the Court is correct that the Constitution creates a
right to choose a pre-viability abortion, then a fortiori the purpose of
hindering women from making such a choice is illegitimate. This illegitimacy is tied to the right itself. There is nothing inherently illegitimate in a state seeking to protect fetal life-through feticide statutes, for
example-but when the state attempts to protect fetal life by preventing
a woman from choosing a pre-viability abortion, the purpose becomes
illegitimate. Without this understanding, Roe and Casey are difficult to
make sense of, because as Alexander Aleinikoff has pointed out, the
result in Roe does not seem explicable as a product of "ad hoc balancing" or other unstructured comparison of competing interests.,
The
problem is that the strength of the competing interests here, a woman's
right to privacy and the government's interest in fetal life, are unknowable in any abstract sense. Therefore, in deciding how to reconcile these
interests, the Court must turn to constitutional principles, to determine at
what point during a pregnancy the existence of fetal life constrains a
woman's liberty right to control her own body. In other words, the
abortion right, like all other constitutional rights, is a limited one, and
the "viability" standard is best understood as defining the contours of

168. 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
169. See generally Brownstein, supranote 23, at 883-85 & n.52. Brownstein makes the further
point that after Casey, the Court apparently will permit abortion regulation designed to "inform" a
woman's choice, so long as it does not hinder the choice, because of the way the Court has defined
the abortion right itself. Id. This is quite consistent with my argument that the same constitutional
principles control the definition of rights and the legitimacy of governmental purposes.
170. Given the non-textual nature of the privacy rights recognized by the Court, calling this
process "interpretive" might seem a stretch, but the point is that the analysis through which the Court
found and defined the underlying constitutional right must also control its analysis of governmental
purposes.
171. See Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 976.
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that right, just as the line between "speech" and "conduct" defines the
7
contours of the speech right. 1
There is a broader point here as well. The Court's apparent recognition of a more general right to sexual privacy in Roe, Casey, and
Griswold v. Connecticut,73 raised profound questions, which the Court
has until now ducked, 74 about the constitutional legitimacy of a state
interest in coercing sexual orthodoxy. Of course, the scope of this privacy "right" remains quite unclear, and therefore so do the limitations
on legitimate state interests in sexual morality. However, the view could
be taken that the Constitution, through the Ninth Amendment and the
common-law decision making apparently authorized by that provision, 75 creates a consistent and coherent right to privacy and autonomy
in the personal sphere. If this view is the correct one, then grave questions are raised about the correctness of decisions like Bowers v.
Hardwick, which seem to presume the legitimacy of the state's asserted
interest in regulating consensual sexual conduct for reasons of
"morality." 76
In conclusion, what is noteworthy about the Court's recent cases is
that the Court has demonstrated both a willingness and an ability to
identify and assess the legitimacy of the purposes underlying a variety
of governmental actions. The Court has also begun to settle upon an
interpretive methodology for engaging in such analysis. There is,
however, an element of incoherence in the Court's opinions, because of
the Court's failure to state clearly the principles driving its search for
improper purposes. The Court's constitutional jurisprudence would be
much improved if it would settle on a logical framework-one that
acknowledged that the scope of government purposes is limited in each
case by the principles underlying the specific constitutional right at
issue.

172. Having analyzed the abortion cases in this way, I must concede that the distinction I draw
between interpretation and balancing may have few practical implications, since in fact the Court
appears to have defined the abortion right as narrowly as it has because of concerns for fetal life.
Abortion is unusual in the realm of rights analysis because very rarely do two competing interests
conflict so directly as here-which perhaps explains why the abortion issue creates so many
difficulties, both legal and social. Moreover, the nontextual nature of the privacy right of course
makes it difficult to claim that the Constitution has prejudged the relative importance of the interests at
issue, which intensifies the tendency for balancing to creep into definitional analysis.
173. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
174. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (deciding that not all private

sexual conduct is constitutionally protected from state proscription).
175. See generally CALVIN R. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS 21-94 (1995) (examining the history of
Ninth Amendment jurisprudence).
176. Cf Schneider, supra note 32, at 112 (generally defending state interest in legislating
morality, but noting that the state interest in Bowers was "particularly problematic").
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2. Limited-Purpose Analysis for Direct Burdens on Core
ConstitutionalRights
Evaluating the legitimacy of government purposes is probably the
most perceptible element of the Court's purpose scrutiny, but it is not
the only way in which the Court has recently expressed a renewed interest in government purposes. In another class of cases, the Court seems
to take an even more stringent approach to governmental purposes.
The Court has held that in certain circumstances, government action will
be permitted only if prompted by particular, specified purposes, with all
other purposes being presumptively invalid. In other words, in these
cases the Court is not merely labeling certain, specified purposes as out
of bounds; it is limiting the universe of acceptable purposes to a specified few.
Often, the Court has presented this analysis under the label of
"strict scrutiny," notably in the Court's recent affirmative action jurisprudence.177 But it is not strict scrutiny in the traditional sense, because
strict scrutiny seems to presume a potentially unlimited number of
"compelling government interests" that could justify infringement of
constitutional rights. 17 The sharpest contrast between traditional strict
scrutiny and the new "limited-purposes" analysis is that traditional
strict scrutiny provided no principles to guide the Court in evaluating
the "compellingness" of a particular government interest. The test
therefore raised serious counter-majoritarian difficulties. In contrast,
the Court's new and developing approach, when honestly conducted,
looks to constitutional principles in defining a class of allowable government purposes. Moreover, this type of purpose analysis does seem
to represent the direction in which strict scrutiny is evolving-and more
to the point, in my view, it is the direction in which it should evolve. If
limited-purpose analysis is to take the place of strict scrutiny, however,
the constitutional principles guiding the Court in its analysis will have to
be better explicated, and adjustments will have to be made to the categories of cases in which strict scrutiny is today invoked if the analysis is to
be workable and retain legitimacy.
To begin with, it must be noted that when the Court limits-and
limits sharply, as the above analysis envisions-the scope of permissible
177. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2110 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493-94 (1989); see also Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,
944-49 (5th Cir. 1996).

178.

See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (protection of electoral process

sufficiently compelling to permit limited, but content-based prohibition on political speech); Roberts v.

United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (preventing discrimination against women is a sufficiently
compelling interest to justify infringing associational rights of private all-male organization);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (national security concerns sufficient to justify
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II).
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government interests, it engages in a highly intrusive form of judicial
review-far more intrusive, for example, than simply finding a few
specified interests to be out of bounds. Some special justification is
therefore needed for such constraints to be imposed on democratic decision making. Moreover, it seems apparent that the justification for
such intense purpose scrutiny can only be found in the Constitution,
and in particular in a special concern that the challenged governmental
action presents core, and not merely peripheral, constitutional concerns.
Under the current three-tiered system, such "special concerns" are
associated with the categories that trigger strict scrutiny-suspect (and
perhaps semi-suspect) classes for equal protection, content-based regulation for free speech, and undue burdens for abortion rights. The current categories provide reasonably satisfactory starting points in
developing guidelines for a searching purpose scrutiny, but they will
need some adjustment (especially in the free speech area) in light of the
differences between traditional strict scrutiny and the limited-purpose
analysis that seems to be taking its place.179 In Part Ill, I will suggest
some beginnings toward reforming the current doctrinal categories.
The central concern of this Article, however, is not the categories that
determine what is needed to trigger this limited-purpose analysis, but
rather the nature of the scrutiny itself.
I will therefore begin by assuming that some special constitutional
concern is present, and that the need for heightened scrutiny is acknowledged. Perhaps the government has chosen to use a "suspect"
classification such as race, or has engaged in intrusive regulation of private speech. 8 ' Under these circumstances, the state's action is presumptively unconstitutional (though rebuttably so), because the action
appears to directly contravene the Constitution.'' There is therefore
good reason for the judiciary to place sharp limits on the purposes that
will be allowed to justify such actions. In other words, in these situations
the Constitution itself should be understood to prejudge the relative
strengths of individual rights against most general governmental purposes, and in favor of the individual litigant. Therefore, the government
should not be able to directly burden core constitutional rights for any
179. In this respect, Michael Dorf's recent article on incidental burdens might provide a useful
starting point in establishing new categories. Dorf distinguishes between direct and incidental
regulation of constitutional rights, and then further distinguishes between substantial and minor
incidental burdens on rights. Searching scrutiny seems clearly appropriate when a direct burden
exists, and as Dorf suggests, at least some level of heightened scrutiny seems necessary with regard
to substantial incidental burdens. See Doff, supra note 18, at 1176-78, 1243-46 (discussing the
difficulties of determining when an incidental burden is substantial).
180. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 116 S. Ct.
2309, 2328 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) ("Curbs on
protected speech ... must be strictly scrutinized.") (citations omitted).
181. See Faigman, supra note 39, at 665-66.

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:297

old reason, even a reason that is described by the state as "compelling."

Instead, it must advance specific, constitutionally approved reasons that
the judiciary, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, finds to be consistent with the underlying purposes of the violated provision."' This is
the core of the argument for intrusive purpose scrutiny, which explicitly
limits allowable government purposes. It is also an argument that certain members of the Court appear to have accepted, at least in certain
contexts." 3
The next question that emerges is how the judiciary should define
what purposes are allowable. Although the case law here is a good deal
less clear, I think a pattern does begin to emerge. The cases are far
from consistent, but it would appear that the Court tends to find allowable-or, in the jargon of the three-tiered system, "compelling"-government interests only when the asserted interest is found to advance the
principles and policies underlying the particularconstitutional provision and right at issue. Having said this, I must acknowledge that there
are clearly contrary cases, in which the Court has found a compelling
interest quite unrelated to the underlying constitutional provision.'" I
would, however, argue that the Court should impose this limitation on
allowable purposes, and that it should only permit highly suspect regulation when on balance the regulation advances the specific constitutional policies that the regulation appears to threaten. I argue for this
sharp limitation on state authority not because other purposes are not
"compelling" as an abstract matter, but because only such a rigorous

182. My description of direct, highly suspect regulations as "violating" the Constitution is perhaps
controversial, but I think defensible-such regulations presumptively do violate the Constitution, even
if the Court later finds the regulations to be justifiable. See Sager, supra note 35, at 933 (state interest
test serves two functions: to define the limits of what the Constitution prohibits, and sometimes to
permit action even though it violates a constitutional right). Justice Holmes appears to have held this
view of the "police power" as justifying constitutional violations. See Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Cooley's Treatise on ConstitutionalLimitations, in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES
268, 269 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995); see also Joseph F. DiMento, Mining the Archives of
Pennsylvania Coal: Heaps of ConstitutionalMischief I1I J. LEGAL HisT. 396, 406 (1990); Robert
Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence": The Myth and Meaning of
Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 623 nn.40-41
(1996).
183. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995); Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2544 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-48
(1993).
184. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-29 (1984) (compelling
interest in preventing discrimination against women justifies infringing on associational rights of
private all-male organization); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-29 (1976) (per curiam) (compelling
interest in limiting corruption and appearance of corruption justifies limits on campaign contributions);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (compelling interest in protecting national
security justifies racially discriminatory policy of exclusion from certain areas).
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approach gives adequate protection to constitutional rights.'85 Any
broader view of allowable purposes inevitably degenerates into ad hoc

balancing, with its lack of predictability and systematic bias in favor of
current governmental needs as opposed to abstract constitutional princi86
ples.1
Such a rule will impose substantial limitations on democratic legislatures. But they are not as severe as one would imagine, because the
types of government actions subject to these sharp restrictions will be
very few-fewer indeed than the number of current cases subject to
"strict scrutiny." And, on the positive side, such a rule properly reflects the primacy of constitutional values within our system of government. Most importantly, only such a categorical rule can ensure that

decisions such as Korematsu, which is the logical outgrowth of ungrounded interest-balancing even in the face of core constitutional violations, do not recur."
a. Limited-Purpose Analysis in Equal ProtectionJurisprudence
Perhaps the clearest example of a "limited purposes" approach in
the Court's jurisprudence can be found in its equal protection decisions

regarding race, most notably in its recent affirmative action cases.
Because these cases involve challenges to racial classifications, they all
invoke heightened, and even "strict," scrutiny.'
In practice, however,
the crucial issues in these cases seem to relate to allowable government

purposes.

In a series of decisions through the 1980s and 1990s

reviewing affirmative action programs, the Court has substantially
185. Of course, even if the Court concludes that an allowable purpose exists, this does not end
the constitutional analysis. The Court must still make an independent judgment whether on net the
challenged action advances the policies underlying the constitutional provision at issue. This analysis
would not be ad hoc balancing; rather it would be an interpretational process combined with some
empirical assessment of the effectiveness of the challenged policies. On the empirical issues,
however, substantial deference to legislative judgments seems inevitable.
186. A principled approach to defining allowable purposes also rebuts Judge Posner's argument
in the Wittmer case that any effort to circumscribe the universe of "compelling" interests is dicta, and
unreasonable dicta at that. See supra note 70. Such statements are dicta only if compelling interests
are identified on an ad hoc basis; otherwise, they are descriptions of the reasoning necessary to reach
the Court's final conclusion, and therefore part of the "holding" of the Court. See generally Michael
C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L REV. 1997 (1994).
187. See Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 986-87 (discussing and citing further commentary on the
tendency of balancing to undermine constitutional rights). By criticizing Korematsu as the product of
interest balancing, I do not mean to suggest that balancing will always weaken individual
protections-indeed, as David Faigman has pointed out, sometimes precisely the opposite will be true.
See Faigman,supra note 39, at 684-86. I do wish to suggest, however, that when interest balancing is
applied to claims of violation of core constitutional rights, as in the Korematsu internment policy
decsion, evisceration of rights is a likely result. The Court is likely to invoke such balancing only
when it wishes to permit a blatantly unconstitutional action.
188. See AdarandConstructors, 115 S. Ct. at 2117; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469,493-94 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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narrowed the class of government interests which can be advanced to
justify benign racial classifications, but has simultaneously recognized
that some allowable purposes do exist. 18 9 In contrast, the Court has
strongly suggested that no government purpose will be allowed to
justify racial classifications that disfavor minorities. 90 This distinction
between benign and malignant racial classifications seems to be inconsistent with the Court's current formulation of the "strict scrutiny"
test. 191 It makes perfect sense, however, if viewed through the lens of
allowable-purposes analysis. Given the history and policies underlying
the Equal Protection Clause, which clearly are centrally aimed at protecting minorities against majoritarian discrimination, there is basically
no government action disfavoring minorities that can be said to advance
equal protection principles. When a classification redresses discrimination against minorities, however, it is easy to see why, on balance, it
might advance equal protection principles, even though some members
of the majority will suffer an injury as a consequence. Thus it seems
clear that unlike truly discriminatory racial classifications, benign racial
classifications are not per se unconstitutional-and the Court has so
acknowledged. 192
A great deal of ambiguity remains, however, in the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence, which is well illustrated by two recent
appellate decisions. In the first of those decisions, Hopwood v. Texas,,"
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down racial preferences in a
public law school's admissions process. The Fifth Circuit concluded
that "the Court appears to have decided that there is essentially only
one compelling state interest to justify racial classifications: remedying
past wrongs."1 94 On the other hand, in an even more recent decision
authored by Chief Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit rejected this narrow
189. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that remedying past discrimination would be an allowable purpose); Croson, 488 U.S. at
493 (plurality opinion) (same); see also Adarand Constructors, 115 S. Ct. at 2127-28 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that diversity should remain a permissible reason to adopt benign racial
classifications). But see Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (rejecting creation of "role models" as a compelling interest).

190.

See Adarand Constructors, 115 S.Ct. at 2136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

An interesting

illustration of this principle is Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), in which the Court reversed a
state judicial decision that had denied a mixed-race couple custody of a child by the mother's
previous marriage on the theory that the child would suffer harm by being exposed to societal
prejudice. In Palmore, the purported state interest, the best interests of the child, was certainly a

compelling one. Indeed, the Court accepted the important nature of the interest, but reversed
anyway. 466 U.S. at 433-34. The best explanation seems to be that the state interest, while certainly
"compelling" in the abstract, was not equality-enhancing.
191. See infra Part III.A.

192.

See AdarandConstructors, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (strict scrutiny is not "fatal in fact"); Wittmer

v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1996) (same).
193. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
194. Id. at 944 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion)).
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position as "dicta," and indeed as "unreasonable" dicta.195 Instead, it
held that the range of allowable compelling interests is much broader,
and includes appropriate penological interests, so long as the interests
asserted are specific and substantiated.
The conflict between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits reveals the incoherence of the Supreme Court's current "compelling interests"
analysis. In particular, it points to a crucial ambiguity in that analysis.
If the Supreme Court really believes that benign racial classifications
should be subject to the strictest form of scrutiny, then Judge Posner's
position-that any type of government interest can justify such a classification so long as it is "truly powerful and worthy"' 9 6 -seems incorrect. Such a standard does not resemble the approach the Court
currently takes to other "strict scrutiny" cases. Instead, it resembles
more closely the approach taken in "intermediate scrutiny" cases-and
the Court rejected the application of intermediate scrutiny for benign
racial classifications in Adarand and Croson. 97
On the other hand, Judge Posner makes a strong case against the
Fifth Circuit's position by pointing out that there is nothing obviously
distinctive about the goal of remedying past discrimination in contrast
to other "legitimate" goals. 98 What is missing from either of these
opinions, however-and understandably so, since it is also missing from
the Supreme Court precedents that they apply-is any explanation of
how courts are to decide which interests will suffice, other than by reliance on judicial instinct as to what goals are "powerful and worthy."
The interesting question, therefore, and one that I will address in greater
detail later in this Article,"9 is precisely which government purposes are
consistent with the policies underlying the Equal Protection Clause. In
particular, I will examine whether the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood was correct to conclude that the only sufficiently compelling purpose for benign racial classifications is remedying prior discrimination by the
acting government body.
Movement in the direction of a limited-purposes approach is further demonstrated by the Court's equal protection jurisprudence with
regard to gender-based classifications, although the case law is far less
consistent in this area. The gender decisions are an interesting case
195. Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 919-21. For my response to this objection, see supra note 186.
196. Id. at 918.
197. See AdarandConstructors, 115 S. Ct. at 2117; Croson,488 U.S. at 493-94. It is possible, of
course, that the scrutiny accorded to benign racial classifications will devolve into something
resembling intermediate scrutiny, despite the Court's current language, so that allowable government
purposes will not be strictly limited. For the purposes of this Article, however, I am inclined to take
the Court at its word regarding the level of scrutiny it is employing, as I think that is the more faithful
reading and more likely result of the Court's decisions in this area.
198. See Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 919.
199. See infra.PartIII.

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:297

study, because even though the Court theoretically applies only intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications, the Court has almost always
struck down such classifications and has created "a strong presumption
that gender classifications are invalid. ' '2 00 In practice, then, the level of
scrutiny applied to gender classifications appears more akin to the scrutiny given to benign racial classifications, rather than to other types of
intermediate scrutiny."0 t The gender case law also evidences a strong
concern with governmental motives-in particular, a concern that gender classifications are based on stereotypes about the abilities and
proper roles of women and men.0 2
One prominent example of the role of purpose scrutiny in decisions considering gender-based policies is the recent VMI decision, in
which the Court's reasoning was distinctly focused on the asserted governmental purpose. There, the Court found that the reasons provided
by Virginia for maintaining the Virginia Military Institute as a maleonly institution were pretextual, and in any event inadequate." 3 Because
VMI involved a classification that hindered women, it was an easy case;
indeed, the result in the case might also be explicable as a finding of a
wholly illegitimate purpose on the part of Virginia-to deny women
certain educational opportunities because of a stereotypical view of the
appropriate social role of women.2 °
But even when a classification appears to benefit women, the Court
has tended to view it with suspicion and has often invalidated such classifications. The Court seems to fear that such "gilded cage" measures
ultimately will not advance the principle of equality."0 5 It has therefore
generally upheld only those gender classifications that were adopted to
200. United States v. Virginia (VM1), 116 S.Ct. 2264,2275 (1996) (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1433 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
201. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425-26 (1994) (stringently
reviewing goverment purposes advanced in defense of gender-based peremptory challenges).
Examples of deferential intermediate scrutiny include the scrutiny accorded under the First
Amendment to time, place, or manner regulations of speech in a public forum, or regulations of
expressive conduct, which are notoriously lenient. See Bhagwat, supra note 14, at 170 & n.134.
202. See VMI, 116 S. C. at 2275 ("[The State's justification] must not rely on overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.")
(citations omitted); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982).
203. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2276-79 & n.8.
204. See id.at 2276 (gender "classifications may not be used ... to create or perpetuate the
legal, social, and economic inferiority of women") (citations omitted); cf. id. at 2289 n.***
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment) (denying that a finding of pretextual state reason
necessarily implies an illegitimate one).
205. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ.for Women, 458 U.S. at 729-30 (permitting men to compete with
women for admission to a previously all-female university); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389
(1979) (allowing men to prevent adoption of their children); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279-83 (1979)

(requiring women to pay alimony); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (striking down law that
set a higher minimum drinking age for men than women); see also Sager, supra note 35, at 952 &

n.36.
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"compensate women 'for particular economic disabilities [they have]
suffered,' to 'promot[e] equal employment opportunity,' to advance
full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people."2"
In other words, these cases suggest that gender-based classifications will
only be upheld when the purpose of the classification is the promotion
of long-term equality between men and women.
There are, however, significant exceptions to this trend. In Rostker
v. Goldberg," the Court sustained the policy requiring only males to
register for the draft, apparently out of deference to Congress' judgment on the role of women in the armed forces. In Michael M. v.
Superior Court,"8 the Court sustained a statutory rape law prohibiting
only sex with underage females. Rostker might be understood as a
special case, where normal, heightened scrutiny was not imposed because of separation-of-powers concerns in the military context;2" or it
might simply be wrongly decided. Michael M., however, is difficult to
reconcile with these principles at all. The Court has thus not yet answered the difficult question of whether gender classifications are truly
subject to limited-purpose analysis-which would mean that only
equality-enhancing purposes are proper-or whether a broader range of
purposes, including ones that do not advance equality, can justify such
classifications. The trend of recent years seems to be toward the more
stringent position, but the jury is still out.
b. Limited-Purpose Analysis in Free Speech Jurisprudence
Outside of the equal protection context, the Court's use of purpose
scrutiny is more haphazard. Although purpose scrutiny is present in the
decisions on a general level, clear analytical patterns do not easily
emerge. When core constitutional rights are involved, for example, the
Court tends to scrutinize proffered government purposes very carefully,
and will only accept those purposes that accord with the principles underlying the substantive constitutional provision. This is especially true
in its free speech cases.
Although the Court's free speech doctrine is confused, many
decisions seem to hold that only limited, speech-promoting purposes
can justify certain types of speech regulation.
But even though
206. VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2276 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per
curiam); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987)) (alterations in
original); see also Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353-55 & n.8 (1974); Sager, supra note 35, at 95152. But see Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 750-51 (1984) (upholding temporary gender-based
classification in social security benefits to protect male retirees who relied on an invalidated statute).
207. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
208. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
209. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1296 (2d Cir. 1996) ("In the military
context... free speech rights are substantially diminished and the courts' deference to the views of

Congress and the military.., is high.").
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attention to purpose seems to underlie much of its free speech
jurisprudence, the Court is not consistent in describing its analysis in the
terminology of purpose scrutiny. To make matters worse, the current
doctrinal categories of free speech jurisprudence-most notably the
distinction
between
"content-based"
and
"content-neutral"
regulations-are not particularly stable or well-suited to purpose
analysis. 210 Because of the awkward fit between the Court's current
doctrine and the principles of purpose scrutiny, the Court's actual
analytical methodology is often obscured. 21' Even so, some patterns do
emerge from the case law.
As a normative matter, principled purpose scrutiny seems to be a
clear improvement over the content analysis and three-tiered review of
current doctrine. And various cases indicate that purpose scrutiny already has a strong influence in free speech jurisprudence. First, much
of free speech doctrine purportedly turns on whether a challenged
regulation is "content-based" or "content-neutral." But an examination of case law reveals that whether a regulation is content-based actually seems to have little impact on whether that regulation will be strictly
scrutinized. This pattern emerges in both Supreme Court and federal
appellate decisions.
Thus, in several cases, what were in truth content-based regulations
have been sustained because the reviewing courts concluded that they
were not enacted for illegitimate, speech-impairing purposes, and did
not burden core free speech rights.1 2 When no obvious illegitimate
motive is present, the Court asks whether the government is seeking to
directly regulate truly private, "high-value" speech. If the answer is
yes, then the Court seems to apply limited-purpose analysis-very few
purposes will suffice to justify regulation. If, however, the answer is
no-if the burden on speech is merely incidental, if the regulation
primarily limits conduct, if the restriction is limited to speech on
government property, or if the speech itself is of questionable value
(such as commercial and perhaps indecent speech)-then the
government is given a much freer hand in selecting purposes. And in
such cases, once the purposes have been selected, the Court tends to be
210. This is because, as discussed supra Part I.C.2, the Court often uses its content analysis as a
means to flush out improper purposes. It does not, however, do so consistently, leading to confusion.
See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994) ("[I]Ilicit legislative intent is
not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment.") (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991) (quoting Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983))) (internal quotations
omitted) (emphasis in original).
211. See Bhagwat, supra note 14, at 162-63.
212. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992); Action for Children's Television v. F-C
(ACTIII), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996). Cf. Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994); Turner Broadcasting,114 S. Ct. at 2445.
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quite deferential to the government's judgments about their relative
importance. A particularly strong example is Burson v. Freeman,213 in
which the Court upheld a statute prohibiting voter solicitation and the
distribution of campaign literature within 100 feet of a polling placeeven though it found the statute to be content-based, and therefore
applied strict scrutiny. The result is inexplicable except in terms of
purpose analysis. In Burson, the content-based nature of the regulation
clearly did not hide an improper motive. Nor was this a direct
regulation of private speech, since the regulation applied only to
government property, and in particular, to property temporarily dedicated to a particular purpose. Therefore, heightened purpose scrutiny
was not required, and the Court could uphold the regulation under the
deferential balancing approach discussed in the next Section.214 Similarly, in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,15 the Court upheld an
injunction against protesters at an abortion clinic because it found the
central purpose of the injunction to be content-neutral and reasonable.
The finding of content-neutrality, however, is quite unconvincing unless
understood as a finding about purpose-which is in fact how the Court
defends it.216 In addition, the Madsen Court also seemed to give courts
much more discretion to restrict speech on public property than on
private property. Such a result cannot be explained by content jurisprudence, which purportedly condemns all content-based regulations,
without drawing distinctions based on the location of the speech (so
long as the government property is a public forum); but it is entirely
consistent with the notion that heightened purpose scrutiny is tied to a
distinction between regulations of fully private speech and speech on
public property.2 7
The Court's free-speech jurisprudence also includes a number of
examples of what appears to be limited-purpose analysis. Again, application of such analysis appears to have no apparent relationship to
content analysis.218 In each of these cases, the Court stringently reviewed
213. 504 U.S. 191, 197-98,211 (1992).
214. See infra. Part II.B.3.
215. 114 S. Ct. 2516,2524-28 (1994).
216. Compare id. at 2523-24 (majority opinion), with id. at 2538 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(explaining why injunction was content-based under any natural understanding).
217. See, e.g., id. at 2528 (striking down injunction as applied to private areas).
218. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995) (striking down a law
prohibiting anonymous campaign literature); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994)
(remanding for apparently stringent review a federal law requiring cable television operators to
dedicate a large percentage of their channel capacity to local broadcasters); Simon & Schuster, Inc.

v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (invalidating law that
escrows income from books describing crimes); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (reversing
a jury award against a newspaper for publishing a rape victim's name that the paper had obtained
legally); Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986)
(holding unconstitutional federal regulations governing corporate electoral expenditures as applied to
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the asserted government interests, giving essentially no deference to
legislative judgments. Yet in only two of the cases-McIntyre and
Simon & Schuster-did the Court even find that the laws were contentbased, and in McIntyre it was far from clear that the finding was necessary for the rigorous scrutiny.1 9 It is true that in most of these
decisions, the Court's scrutiny does not explicitly discuss the advancement of First Amendment policies, but especially in the political speech
cases, such as McIntyre and Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the idea
seems to be very much present. Moreover, the Turner Broadcasting
decision, perhaps the most confusing of the group, seems explicable in

no other way. In Turner, after concluding that the challenged "mustcarry" rules for cable operators were content-neutral,220 the Supreme
Court remanded to the lower court for a determination of whether the
law actually advanced the government's stated objectives of preserving
free television and increasing diversity among publicly-accessible
speech. The Court apparently envisioned a rigorous lower court review." Though seemingly incoherent under current doctrine, Turner is
a nice illustration of purpose scrutiny. The Court was faced with a law
that directly regulated private speech, and was thus presumptively
unconstitutional. However, the key purpose motivating the legislationincreasing diversity among speakers-is one that both the Court and
numerous commentators have recognized as advancing the purposes of
the First Amendment.' A remand was therefore necessary to determine
whether the regulation actually advanced First Amendment policies.223

a non-profit corporation); see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)
(upholding restrictions on election spending by corporations).
219. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1519 ("When a law burdens core political speech, we apply
,exacting scrutiny."'); see also Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309,2319-21 (1996) (striking down limitations on campaign spending by political
party); id, at 2328 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) ("Curbs on
protected speech... must be strictly scrutinized.").
220. See TurnerBroadcasting,114 S. Ct. at 2470-72.
221. See id
222. See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 594 (1981); FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 800 &n.18 (1978); United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,
406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27 (1972); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 48-51 (1993); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA
L REV. 1405, 1411 (1986). See generallyBhagwat, supra note 14, at 178-79.
223. I should note that even if diversity-enhancement is seen as a purpose consistent with First
Amendment policies, and therefore an allowable reason to regulate private speech, that does not
mean that any method of advancing diversity will necessarily survive scrutiny. In a case involving
such a method, the Court must still determine whether, as a matter of substantive First Amendment
analysis, there are any restrictions on how the government may pursue these goals. Compare
Bhagwat, supra note 14, at 193-208, with Cass R. Sunstein, A New Deal for Speech, 17 HASTINOS
CoMm. & Er. U_. 137, 145-60 (1994).
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c. Limited-PurposeAnalysis in Other Areas of Constitutional
Jurisprudence
Scrutiny of governmental purposes, and limitations on allowable
purposes, can be found in other areas of constitutional analysis as well,
although such trends are often not explicitly acknowledged. In the
context of free exercise of religion, the Court seems unlikely to find any
government purpose sufficient to uphold regulation intended to burden
religious practices, presumably because it is difficult to imagine such a,
purpose that is consistent with principles of religious liberty.224 On the
other hand, it seems willing to uphold regulation that only incidentally
burdens religious exercise under its very deferential balancing test.2z
Similarly, in its voting rights cases, the Court has tended to uphold restrictions if and only if the purpose behind the restrictions is to protect,
organize, and advance the electoral process-in other words, if the government purpose is consistent with the policies underlying the right to
vote. 26
The most interesting illustration of this tendency-accepting limitations on rights only if the purpose behind the limitation is consistent
with the underlying constitutional policies-can be found in the abortion-rights context. There, the Court permits regulation designed to
protect women's health and to "inform" women of the consequences
of abortion-i.e., attempts to convince her not to choose abortion at all.
The Court will not, however, permit regulations designed to hinder the
choice itself. 227 The explanation for this distinction appears to lie in the
Court's definition of the scope of the abortion right. The Court appears
to understand the abortion right as protecting a woman's right to make
an informed choice and to secure a reasonably safe abortion, rather than
as a more unlimited right to personal autonomy. Under this definition,
regulations of the medical aspects of abortion-mandating information
disclosure, or perhaps even waiting periods-might be considered not
224. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993);
Brownstein, supra note 23, at 934-35.
225. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
226. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439-41 (1992) (upholding prohibition on writein voting in part based on a state's interest in preventing "party raiding" and thus strengthening the
electoral process overall); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736-37 (1974) (upholding ban on
independent candidates who were recently members of political parties); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410
U.S. 752, 762 (1973) (upholding "delayed enrollment" for primary elections). But see Eu v. San
Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989); Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479
U.S. 208 (1986); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,
395 U.S. 621 (1969) (all striking down election regulations that did not advance the electoral
process).
227. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-78 (1992).
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only legitimate, but totally consistent with the policies underlying the
abortion right." In conclusion, although the Court has been far from
consistent, there is a clear tendency across doctrinal areas to permit direct burdens on core constitutional rights if and only if the ultimate
purpose of the burden is to advance the principles underlying that right.
d. Limited-PurposeAnalysis in Extreme Cases
One somewhat intractable issue that remains with regard to purpose
scrutiny is what to do in the so-called "hard cases." Even the most vocal critics of constitutional balancing agree that in certain, extreme
situations, the Court must sometimes permit action that clearly seems to
violate the Constitution. 9 The classic example is the one presented in
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,"' of a newspaper that plans to publish
the departure times of troop ships in time of war. Another example
might be the need to segregate prisoners temporarily by race in the face
of potential rioting." The limited-purpose framework does not appear
to leave any room for such a safety valve. One answer to this objection
might be to stress the rarity of such occurrences-the government rarely
has an extreme need to violate constitutional rights directly because the
vast majority of emergency cases require merely incidental or marginal
burdens on rights. And in such cases, balancing is already, and should
continue to be, the preferred mode of analysis.232 Another more potent
answer to the objection is that the Court has defined the scope of
"core" constitutional rights with just such extreme situations in mind.233
Moreover, case law suggests that in such cases valid, countervailing government interests will often be rooted in the very constitutional provision being infringed-in other words, the government may be
infringing the rights of some citizens in order to safeguard the rights of
the majority. Thus, true dilemmas are likely to be rare under a limitedpurposes approach.
Admittedly, the above responses do not resolve the troop-ship or
prison-riot problems. Although the subject is beyond the scope of this
228. See Brownstein, supra note 23, at 885 & n.58; Doff, supra note 18, at 1224-26. Another
explanation for the expansion of permitted government interests in the abortion context might be that
the Casey Court demoted the abortion right to non-fundamental status. If so, the Court has consigned
abortion rights to mere balancing scrutiny, with deference given to the government's assessment of its
interests. I do not, however, think that this is the best reading of Casey.
229. See Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 999-1000; Pildes, supra note 35, at 714.
230. 283 U.S. 697,716 (1931).
231.
Cf. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (per curiam) (explaining that prison
officials have a right in certain circumstances to take racial tensions into account to maintain order);
Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 1996) (assuming that separation of races in prison during
a race riot is not unconstitutional).
232. See infra Part II.B.3.
233. Compare Dorf, supra note 18, at 1227-28, with Faigman, supra note 105, at 756-57.
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Article, I would like to reiterate Alexander Aleinikoff's suggestion that
courts should not allow the need for exceptions in extreme cases, or the
ability to think up outlandish hypotheticals, to guide their analysis in
typical cases.2m Moreover, because Supreme Court justices are only
human beings living in a social context, there is a grave danger in recognizing broad constitutional exceptions for special circumstances. In a
time of passion, a politicized Supreme Court may pick up on such exceptions as a reason to uphold blatantly unconstitutional actions. This is
what happened in Korematsu v. United States,235 and the same thing
could easily have happened in a different context in New York Times Co.
v. United States, the Pentagon Papers case. 236 There may be enough
room in equitable standards governing the granting of injunctive relief
to permit necessary safety valves. In any event, however, there seems to
be no pressing need to distort mainstream constitutional doctrine because of the potential for such emergencies.
3. Balancing Analysis for Incidental or Unintended Burdens
Many constitutional disputes do not fall into either of the above
two categories. In many cases where a constitutional violation is alleged,
the government is acting for an entirely legitimate purpose. Moreover,
often in these cases the government has not directly invaded core constitutional rights, so as to trigger limited-purpose analysis. Instead, it is
acting in an area of peripheral constitutional concern, or has imposed a
merely incidental burden on a constitutional right. However, the effect
of the law is to place some substantial burden on the exercise of a recognized constitutional right, and therefore to raise serious constitutional
concerns. In these situations, there is a real clash between constitutional
values and legitimate governmental purposes, and the Constitution has
not itself prejudged the relative weight of those values. Because of this
uncertainty, ad hoc balancing has been the rule. Even where the
Court's doctrine does not speak in the language of balancing, the results
in these cases appear to reflect a case-by-case comparison of the
strength of the individual and government interests involved.237
In some areas, such as First Amendment free speech and free exercise litigation, most cases fall into this third category. These include, as
234. See Aleinikoff, supranote 33, at 1000; cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 528 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (reciting danger of establishing doctrine based on facts
of "great" or "hard" cases).
235. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II).
But see id. at 245-46 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (explaining particular harm caused by a judicial opinion
sustaining an unconstitutional action).
236. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (denying injunction against publication of classified government
documents regarding prosecution of Vietnam War).
237. Moreover, in some instances involving minor, incidental burdens on rights, no scrutiny at all
might be required. See Dorf, supra note 18, at 1243-46.
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discussed above, cases involving speech on government property
(Burson v. Freeman and Madsen v. Women's Health Center), and a

number of cases involving so called "low-value" speech. For example,
in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,21s the Court upheld a zoning
statute restricting the location of theaters that exhibited "adult" films.
It found that the statute was not content-based because it was justified
without reference to the content of speech-i.e., because the purpose
behind the statute was less related to content than to the secondary
effects of that content on the community. 239 But this narrow understanding of what is "content-based" is somewhat awkward and, more
importantly, does not comport with other cases finding content regulation regardless of purpose.'
The best explanation for the City of
Renton decision appears to lie in the fact that although the zoning
ordinance was a direct regulation of private speech, and indeed was also
"content-based" regulation by any reasonable understanding, it concerned the regulation of "indecent" speech, which arguably receives a
lower level of constitutional protection."4 City of Renton, and many of
the Court's other cases involving sexually explicit speech, can be
understood as an example of a more general aspect of the Court's free
238. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
239. See id. at 47-48; accord Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)
("Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is 'justified without
reference to the content of reguated speech."') (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)) (emphasis in original). Of course, the City of Renton Court
simultaneously, and somewhat inexplicably, disclaimed any reliance on legislative motive in its
analysis. It drew a sharp distinction between legislative motive-why the legislature enacted a lawand legislative intent-how the legislature formally justified its law. The Court noted that "this Court
will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative
motive." City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84
(1968)). The Court's disavowal of a motive inquiry in City of Renton-and in O'Brien, the seminal
case on which the Court relies-seems to have been driven by a reluctance to strike down legislation
which under the Court's precedents was quite clearly improperly motivated-in City of Renton,
because of hostility to an "adult" theater, and in O'Brien, because of hostility to the anti.Vietnam
War message conveyed by draft card burning. It should be noted, though, that the flat constitutional
principle stated in City of Renton and O'Brien has not been followed historically. See Hunter v.
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (invalidating 1901 state constitutional provision because it was
motivated in part by racism, even though the same provision, if adopted with neutral motives, might be
upheld).
240. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994); City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428-30 (1993).
241. See Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374
(1996) (partially upholding regulation of indecent cable speech); cf. id. at 2391 ("Nor need we here
determine whether, or the extent to which, Pacifica does, or does not, impose some lesser standard of
review where indecent speech is at issue.") (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-48,
761-62 (1978)); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (upholding ban on private possession of child
pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding prohibition on distribution of
child pornography); Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT III), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(en banc) (upholding ban on daytime broadcast of indecent materials), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701
(1996).
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speech jurisprudence-the classification of entire categories of speech

as "low-valued." Under this jurisprudential scheme, disfavored speech
becomes subject to direct government regulation without stringent
purpose scrutiny because regulation of such speech does not raise core
constitutional concerns. Instead, "low-valued" speech cases are generally resolved through balancing, which normally involves strong deference to governmental purposes. In some instances, such speech is given
no constitutional protection at all.242 Commercial speech, "fighting

words," and libelous speech appear to constitute other categories of
243

such "low-valued" speech.
More generally, balancing is required whenever a generally acceptable statute is applied to a protected activity, thereby creating an incidental (and presumably unintended) burden. Broad regulations of

242. The prime examples of speech entirely denied constitutional protection are child
pornography and obscenity. For example, in the Osborne and Ferberdecisions, the Court employed
"definitional" rather than ad hoc balancing to entirely deny First Amendment protection to a category
of speech--child pornography. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108-11; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757-64.
Obscene speech has been treated similarly. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
Definitional balancing requires the Court to balance free speech interests against the strength of
governmental objectives with regard to an entire category of speech, rather than with regard to
specific burdens on speech, as is the case with ad hoc balancing. David Faigman has criticized this
type of analysis, claiming that it improperly relies on the strength of government interests in defining
the scope of the speech right itself. See Faigman, supra note 96, at 1557-62. While the Court's
decisions in this area, which purport to define obscenity (for example) as "not-speech," justify
Faigman's critique, I am not convinced that these cases in fact rely on such reasoning. It seems to me
that the child pornography decisions and the obscenity decisions, like other cases involving indecent
speech, necessarily reflect a priorjudgment by the Court that the speech at issue, because of its
sexual content, is of lower constitutional value and therefore not within the full ambit of the First
Amendment. One cannot, for example, imagine the Court upholding a ban on politicalspeech based
on reasoning parallel to that of Ferber. Therefore, the cases are best understood to involve merely a
broad, categorical application of the general balancing approach that dominates the Court's middle
tier of scrutiny. Of course, none of this is to say that the Court's categorical approach to these types
of speech, which entirely denies constitutional protection rather than engaging in case-by-case
balancing, is necessarily proper or wise. It should be noted, moreover, that even seemingly
"unprotected" speech, such as obscenity or child pornography, is generally accorded some
constitutional protection by defining the unprotected categories of speech extremely narrowly, in the
course of "definitional" balancing. See, e.g., Miller,413 U.S. at 24.
243. For a general discussion of the Court's categorical approach to "low-valued" speech, see
Kagan, supra note 86, at 472-83. Kagan seeks to explain the creation of these categories as a
product of motive analysis, suggesting that the Court's greater tolerance for regulation of such speech
reflects a perception that the regulation is rarely improperly motivated. I find that explanation
unconvincing, however, because at least some less-protected speech, such as indecent speech, is
clearly the target of greater regulation because of ideological hostility on the part of the government.
The better explanation for these categories is that the Court classifies such speech as unrelated, or
only tangentially related, to the purposes of the First Amendment. Of course, if the Court changes its
mind about the place of allegedly "low-valued" speech in the First Amendment hierarchy, its
approach to regulation of such speech might change. There are hints in recent cases that such a
change might be occuring with respect to regulations of commercial speech.
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conduct, as applied to expressive activity, raise this concern, as do general statutes that have the effect of burdening religious exercise.2"
The questions of how ad hoc balancing should be applied, and
whether it is even possible to engage in balancing in a coherent manner,
are beyond the scope of this Article. It seems evident to me that some
form of judicial balancing is inevitable if rights are not to be radically
underprotected. After all, it is quite impossible, if government is to
function at all, for the judiciary to review stringently every government
action that incidentally burdens individual rights.245 Indeed, this reality
appears to have driven the Court's recent jurisprudence, especially its
middle tier of scrutiny, towards a balancing methodology. Although
balancing inevitably increases the role of subjective judgment in constitutional decision making, such subjectivity is an unavoidable component of a legal system that is forced to make extremely delicate
accommodations of competing social and individual interests.246
Even if the need for balancing is conceded, however, the question
remains as to how government interests should be evaluated, and what
kind of balancing the courts should apply in the purpose scrutiny context. The discussion here can be very brief, because the conclusion is
simple. In the context of ad hoc balancing, the number of legitimate
governmental purposes is essentially unlimited-indeed, it is the unlimited scope of permissible governmental purposes that necessitates balancing in the first place.247 With respect to purpose scrutiny, the
counter-majoritarian difficulty is at a height here. As a result, in the
context of ad hoc balancing courts must defer to legislative and executive judgments regarding the need for, and importance of, a particular
action; any other approach would constitute untethered, and unjustifiable, judicial second-guessing of democratic judgments. Thus in the
context of true balancing, the Court should not, and generally does
244. Compare Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (ruling that such incidental
burdens receive no constitutional scrutiny) with Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb) (apparently restoring a
balancing test in such cases).
245. See Bhagwat, supranote 14, at 169-70 (explaining why balancing cannot be avoided with
regard to regulation of speech on government property and regulation of conduct that incidentally
burdens speech); see also Dorf, supra note 18, at 1251; Faigman, supra note 39; Fiss, supranote 50. It
is important to note, though, that just because balancing is required does not mean the results cannot
be constrained somewhat, and the scales tilted, through the application of subsidiary principles. See,

e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693-703 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in thejudgment) (discussing the use of weighted balancing to resolve public

forum disputes).
246. See generally Chemerinsky, supranote 82, at 1117-18.
247. See Fallon, supra note 33, at 348-51 (describing the proliferation of permissible government
purposes); Sheppard, supra note 33, at 984-85; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 977
("[Balancing takes an expansive view of what should count as a constitutional interest."); Faigman,
supra note 105, at 757-64.
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not, 21' engage in any purpose scrutiny. Instead, it limits its analysis to
defining individual rights, and weighing them against governmental
purposes whose strength is derived from the fact and nature of legislative action.
Under this purpose scrutiny framework, courts will-and shoulddefer to the wishes of the elected branches as to the importance of their
chosen objectives. This deference should not, however, extend to the
elected branches' measure of the strength of the individual right or the
result of the balancing process. The courts possess a unique institutional ability and obligation to protect individual rights against majoritarian intrusion.24 9 In these cases, therefore, courts should independently
compare the significance of the burden on the individual right against
the importance of the governmental purpose to determine if the government action should be permittedY
The difficult question that remains is whether the courts should always accept the government's assertion regarding the importance of its
purposes. One approach, generally followed by the modem Court in its
rational basis review but not in higher tiers, would be to accept any
statement of a governmental purpose, including an ex post creation of
counsel."' In balancing cases, where there is a substantial, albeit unintended or incidental, burden on a constitutional right, this seems too
deferential an approach. Instead, for courts to defer to a democratic
judgment in this area there should be some indication that such a judgment has actually been made. Sanford Levinson makes the point that
when a facially neutral law is applied in a manner that burdens constitutional rights, the enacting legislature has frequently made no judgment
about the relative importance of the government interest in that particular application of the lawY 2 He therefore suggests process-oriented
limitations on deference to government statements of compelling interests. 3
One cannot go too far in this regard, of course, because decisions
regarding specific applications of general laws are typically made by
prosecutors, or other executive branch officials, not legislatures. It
would be utterly unreasonable to expect ex ante legislative consideration
248. See supraPart I.B.
249. See Faigman,supra note 96, at 1525-29.
250. See Aleinikoff, supra note 33, at 984-86; Faigman, supra note 39, at 655.
251. See Faigman, supra note 39, at 681 (even if no government purpose is apparent, the Court
will uphold the legislation if it can devise ajustification under current doctrine).
252. To demonstrate this point, Levinson uses the example, from the Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), of the application of drug laws to the use of
peyote in Native American spiritual ceremonies. See Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Compelling
State Interest: On "Due Process of Lawmaking" and the Professional Responsibility of the Public
Lavyer, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1035, 1036-46 (1994).
253. See id.
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of every possible application of a law. However, it does seem reasonable
as a prerequisite for deference to require that an elected official, or an

appointee of such an official, has made a reasoned and consistent judgment regarding the strength of the government's purposes underlying
both the general legislation, and the particular application being challenged." 4
Finally, I should note that in defending and advocating a reinvigorated purpose scrutiny, I do not mean to suggest that courts should cease
their scrutiny of government means. In fact, at least some degree of

means scrutiny will always remain essential, if for no other reason than
to smoke out pretextual ends, the function that means scrutiny arguably
performs today. 5 I do believe, however, that if purpose scrutiny is revived, means scrutiny will and should become more deferential, reflecting greater legislative competence in this area.
FIGURE 1
FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF GOVERNMENT PURPOSES
Direct Burden on Core
Constitutional Right

Incidental Burden or
Marginal Right

Minor, Incidental
Burden

Illegitimate
Purpose

Illegitimate purpose
analysis: law is
invalidated

Illegitimate purpose
analysis: law is
invalidated

Illegitimate purpose
analysis: law Is
invalidated

Legitimate
Purpose

Limited-purpose analysis:
law is valid only if
purpose is consistent with
principles underlying
substantive constitutional
right

Balancing test Court's
assessment of the burden
on rights should be
measured against
government's
assessment of the
importance of the
governmental purpose

No Scrutiny

III
DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS: SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS

Without attempting to rewrite all of constitutional doctrine, this Part
undertakes a preliminary discussion of how purpose scrutiny points to

the need for further changes in the Court's current doctrinal frame254. If only an executive officer's judgment is at issue, then it would appear proper to permit the
judgment to be first articulated and explained during litigation, unlike a legislative judgment. In
addition, if only a facial challenge has been brought, then deference will be necessary to the
legislative judgment alone.
255. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627-28 (1996); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 44950 (1985); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-38 (1969); Gunther, supra note 7, at 45-46; Sager,
supranote 35, at 937-38; Sheppard, supranote 33, at 991-93.
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work. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the Court often
employs purpose-oriented analysis similar to the type recommended by
this Article, although it does not always couch its reasoning in those
terms. The question addressed here is how the language of the Court's
opinions would change if it were to make explicit what it now tends to
do implicitly-in other words, how the written doctrine would and
should change if purpose scrutiny were explicitly adopted as a form of
constitutional analysis. Given the substantial continuity between the
proposals set out in this Article and the Court's current practice, it
should come as no surprise that the suggested changes are incremental,
rather than revolutionary.
A. Equal Protection Doctrine
If the Court were to adopt purpose scrutiny explicitly, its equal
protection doctrine would require less adjustment than many other areas. Equal protection is already the most purpose-conscious area of the
Court's jurisprudence. For example, the Court has already recognized
explicitly that the Equal Protection Clause creates certain principlesthe strong anti-caste principle recognized in Moreno, Cleburne, and
Romer, and the anti-parochialism principle recognized in Shapiro v.
Thompson and its progeny-that render certain government purposes
entirely illegitimate when they underlie classifications drawn among
citizens. ' It has also recognized the crucial role played by govern7
mental purpose in its "strict scrutiny" race cases.5
Regarding illegitimate purpose analysis, only two adjustments to
the Court's equal protection doctrine seem advisable. First, the Court
should make it clear precisely how it has derived the relevant principles
from the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, it should set the limits of
those principles." In addition, a more explicit focus on forbidden purposes might reveal other governmental purposes, beyond animus-driven
class discrimination and parochialism, 9 that are forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause. Such an explication might raise some difficult substantive questions,"6 but it would contribute substantially to the clarity of
the Court's doctrine.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
257. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976); cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
258. Such an explication might lead the Court to reconsider its conclusions that certain principles,
including perhaps the anti-parochialism principle, can properly be found in the Fourteenth

Amendment.
259. See supra Part I.C.1.
260. One example of such a difficult question might be the one that seems to have divided the
majority and dissent in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), which is whether the anti-caste
principle can be extended to classifications such as homosexuality, which is defined primarily based
on conduct that is not constitutionally protected (or at least not while Bowers v. Hardwick remains
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In other areas of its equal protection doctrine, there is more room
for doctrinal clarification. With regard to gender classifications, the
Court's jurisprudence is simply confused; some cases suggest that gender classifications are highly suspect, and may be adopted only for limited, equality-enhancing purposes, but others seem to adopt a more ad
hoc balancing approach. 26' To create a coherent analysis, the Court
must first determine why it considers gender to be a classification worthy of special scrutiny (a point that might seem obvious, but apparently
is not so to some members of the Court). That is to say, what principles
underlie the constitutional right to be free of discrimination based on
one's gender? Based on the conclusions reached by that exercise, the
Court must determine what kinds of government motives will justify a
gender classification. In particular, the strong trend of the cases, and the
better position, seems to be to treat gender discrimination as raising core
equal protection concerns, which would then subject gender classifications to limited-purpose analysis.262
This analysis does not imply that gender classifications must be
treated the same as racial classifications. 263 For example, some gender
classifications that seemingly favor women are treated with a great deal
of suspicion-in some instances with greater suspicion than benign racial classifications. Under the equality principle, a gender classification
that does not help to make up for discrimination against women26 may
be viewed as a "gilded cage," trapping women in outmoded gender
roles.2 65 More fundamentally, there appear to be more reasons for the
government to treat men and women differently, consistent with the
equality principle, than with regard to race-an obvious example being
that "separate but equal" educational facilities do not seem to be per se
unconstitutional for the sexes, 266 but are obviously so in the context of
race. 267 Broadly speaking, the concept of "equality" has a slightly different meaning when applied to gender as opposed to race. In the context of race, the objective of equal protection policy seems to be that
good law). I have already explained, supra Part I.C.1, why I think the anti-caste principle is
properly so extended.
261. See supratext accompanying notes 200-209.
262. See United States v. Virginia (VMJ), 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274-76 (1996); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1433-34 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
263. But see VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2295-96 (ScaliaJ, dissenting) (implying that the Court has begun
to apply the same scrutiny to gender classifications as to racial classifications).
264. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per curiam) (upholding regulation
giving women greater Social Security benefits than men because it helped reduce economic disparity
between genders); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1974) (upholding differing property tax
treatment for widows and widowers for the same reason).
265. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1423.
266. See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2276-77 nn. 7-8.
267. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
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people will have the same opportunities, and be treated in the same way,

regardless of skin color-until, ultimately, race will simply not matter in
civil society. With gender, however, that is not necessarily so; biological
differences between the sexes will remain in existence, and therefore
true "equality" might well require differing treatment. This is not to
say that gender discrimination is less significant, or a less important
concern of equal protection policy, than race discrimination-but it is
different.26 The Court should confront this fact. By discussing how and
why equal protection doctrine differs between the gender and racial
contexts, the Court could clarify its doctrine immeasurably.
A shift toward a purpose-oriented framework would lead to particularly interesting doctrinal implications in the area of racial classifi-

cations. Traditionally, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to racial
classifications disfavoring minority groups, and at least since World War
II, it has allowed no government purpose to justify such a classification.269 The Court should make this explicit, and end the farce of "strict
scrutiny" review, if for no other reason than the danger of another

Korematsu in a time of social stress. The more difficult issue has to do
with benign racial classifications-those designed to favor previously

discriminated against minorities. 7 0 Here, despite the language of strict
27
scrutiny, the Court has emphasized that scrutiny is not "fatal in fact.""
Although the Court has already moved towards a limited-purposes
analysis, it has not yet decided what governmental purposes are permitted in this context. Nor has it grounded its analysis in the principles
underlying the Equal Protection Clause.272 The Court has recognized
268. This point is closely related to David Faigman's insightful critique of equal protection tiers
of scrutiny. Faigman argues that the Court appears to lower the level of scrutiny in certain cases
when it perceives that a particular government interest is a valid one. See Faigman, supra note 96, at
1563-65. Whether it is engaging in "balancing" as Faigman believes, or in "purpose scrutiny" as I
believe, the Court's critical error lies in assuming that the choice of a "tier of scrutiny" or "level of
review" also dictates a conclusion as to the strength and permissibility of government interests.
269. In the years following Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II), the Court has consistently prohibited all
such racial classifications. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down statute
prohibiting miscegenation); Brown, 347 U.S. at 483 (prohibiting racial segregation in public schools).
Even before Brown, the Court sometimes struck down an obviously invidious racial classification.
See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
270. Of course, the difference between benign and invidious discriminatory classifications is not
always clear-although Justice Stevens has argued that the difference is often an obvious and wellunderstood one, and is not difficult to apply in most cases. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
115 S. Ct. 2097, 2121-22 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 2117 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotations omitted); see also Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916,
918 (7th Cir. 1996). This statement of course represents yet another move away from Gerald
Gunther's pathbreaking article regarding equal protection. See Gunther supra note 7.
272. To be precise, the Court as a whole has not stated a clear position on this point. Individual
members have done so, however, essentially suggesting that no purpose will suffice to justify any
racial classification, because the primary principle underlying the Equal Protection Clause is one of
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one acceptable purpose for such classifications-remedying past discrimination-which seems obviously consistent with the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment. But the Court's recognition of this, and thus
far no other, allowable purpose seems to be the product of ad hoc balancing, of judicial distaste for racial classifications, rather than of reasoned, interpretive analysis. For example, little else can explain the
distinction drawn by some courts permitting racial classifications designed to remedy public discrimination, but not private or societal discrimination. After all, combating all of these forms of discrimination
seems to advance the principles behind the Equal Protection Clause."'
The ad hoc nature of the current doctrine is particularly evident in
the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Wittmer v. Peters. In that case,
Judge Posner concluded that benign racial classifications-"reverse discrimination," in the language of the court-could survive strict scrutiny
if motivated by any "truly powerful and worthy concern," presumably
as evaluated by the reviewing court. 7 4 The state's expressed purpose in
Wittmer was the desire to hire some black supervisors for a "correctional
boot camp" for adult offenders, where the majority of the boot camp's
population was African American. The court accepted the state's empirical argument that the "adversarial" model of such institutions simply could not work "with as white a staff as it would have had if a black
'
male had not been appointed to one of the lieutenant slots."275
It therefore found that the state had advanced a sufficiently compelling purpose.
The Wittmer analysis seems peculiar and incomplete, howeversurely the state could not have provided a preference for a white applicant over a black one because of the racism of the institution's white
inmates.276 I do not mean to suggest that the court's conclusion was incorrect, but it cannot be that the challenged racial preference was constitutional merely because the underlying motivation was "worthy" in
some abstract sense. Under a purpose scrutiny framework, Illinois's use
of a racial preference would be allowable only if its purposepresumably to recognize and compensate for the lingering effects of
color-blindness and formal equality. See Adarand Constructors, 115 S.Ct. at 2118-19 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). This view, of course, is one possible understanding of the purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment, although it seems to me an implausible one, for reasons both historical
and practical. See Baker, supra note 14, at 124-125 n.225 (arguing that the state can use a racial
classification to achieve the "unobjectionable" purpose of promoting an egalatarian society).

273.

See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,498-99 (1989); Hopwood v. Texas,

78 F.3d 932, 948-55 (5th Cir. 1996).
274. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1996).

275. Id. at 920.
276. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that an individual should not be
denied a right simply because recognition of that right might be met with societal prejudice).
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historical and societal discrimination on the attitudes of minority inmates-is consistent with and advances equal protection policies. It is
my view that the remedial purposes of the Equal Protection Clause are
probably broad enough to encompass such a state policy, but that is a
question of substantive interpretation that the courts have only implicitly
addressed.
The question of whether the enhancement of diversity is an allowable government purpose is particularly difficult. In Hopwood v. Texas,
the Fifth Circuit concluded-or more accurately, held that the Supreme
Court had concluded-that fostering racial diversity in educational or
employment settings is not a compelling government purpose, presumably because it is inconsistent with equal protection principles.277 It
left the reason why essentially unexplained. 27 One interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause holds that the clause requires absolute colorblindness on the part of the government,279 which would prohibit any
race-based classifications. The contrary view, based on the perceived
value of pluralism, finds a diversity-enhancing purpose entirely consistent with the principles underlying the clause.28 If the Court has chosen
between these views, it must explain where in the text, history, or purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment it has found the basis for doing so.
B. Free Speech Doctrine

As I have already discussed, the Supreme Court's free speech doctrine is in disarray."' Although a more explicit purpose scrutiny may
point the way for a more coherent reformulation of the doctrine, it cannot provide a complete answer, or a substitute for a thorough rethinking. Nevertheless, the lens of purpose analysis does generate some

277. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-48 (5th Cir. 1996); see generally Note, An
Evidentiary Framework for Diversity as a Compelling Interest in Higher Education, 109 HARV. L
REV.

1357 (1996).

278. There is some suggestion in the Fifth Circuit's opinion that the problem with the diversity
rationale is that it encourages "racial stereotypes." Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945. What is not clear,
however, is why the court considers, as it apparently does, an interest in racial pluralism to be
inherently contrary to equal protection principles.
279. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118-19 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
280. See id. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566-68
(1990), overruled by Adarand Instructors, 115 S. Ct. at 2097; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267,314-15 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
311-15 (1978).
281. See supratext accompanying notes 116-122, 210-223; see also Bhagwat, supra note 14, at
158-72. For a criticism of the current free speech doctrine that is distinct from, but overlaps
somewhat with the analysis in this Article, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible
Tailoring and TranscendingStrict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L REv. 2417 (1996).
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insights into the Court's current categories and how its analysis is leading it astray.
First and foremost, the Court should abandon its current distinction
between content-based and content-neutral regulations. The Court appears to employ this analysis mainly to identify improperly motivated
regulations," 2 but "content" is a poorly-suited tool for such a task. To
be sure, content-based regulations are often motivated by hostility to
targeted speech, which is certainly an impermissible purpose. Equally
clearly, however, that is not always the case. In turn, this suggests that
the relationship between content and purpose could be captured more
accurately by a rebuttable presumption than by the current inflexible,
categorical analysis. Rather than using content as a proxy for bad motive, the Court would be better served simply to conduct a direct inquiry
into purpose, guided by whatever presumptions it cares to establish.
Such a doctrinal adjustment would also permit the Court to identify
more explicitly the category of government actions that it believes pose
a fundamental threat to First Amendment values, and which therefore
should be subject to limited-purpose analysis. Content analysis has
failed to perform this task, in part because it serves two unrelated purposes in the Court's jurisprudence: to smoke out illicit legislative motives,"8 3 and to identify the speech regulations that raise the most serious
concerns.2" 4 But the Court has not clearly distinguished these functions,
and does not in individual cases consistently state or determine which
function its content analysis is performing. Therefore, it is often less
than clear what the consequence of a content classification should be.
Not only does it have trouble identifying illegitimate purposes, but
the content classification does not serve the heightened scrutiny function particularly well, either." 5 I have argued in this Article that the ap282. See supra text accompanying notes 116-122; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114
S. Ct. 2445,2458-59 (1994); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397,414-17 (1989); Brownstein, supra note 23, at 922-23.
283. See Kagan, supra note 86, at 451; see also supra text accompanying notes 117-128.
284. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428-31 (1993)
(striking down a local ordinance prohibiting the distribution of "commercial handbills" on public
property); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
115-18 (1991) (holding that a statute that imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the

content of their speech is presumptively unconstitutional); see also Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating a statute requiring newspapers to print replies of political
candidates to criticism).
285. The Discovery Network decision is a particularly good example of the failure of content
analysis to identify actions of particular concern. The case involved an ordinance that distinguished
between commercial and noncommercial newspapers in regulating the placement of news racks on
public property. The ultimate government purpose-the prevention of clutter on sidewalks-was
obviously legitimate, and the distinction it had drawn, based as it was on the Court's own case law
placing a lower value on commercial speech in the First Amendment hierarchy, also seems

unproblematic. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 435-36 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Yet based
on a formalistic content analysis, the Court concluded that strict scrutiny should apply, and struck
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propriate category for heightened purpose scrutiny-limited-purpose
analysis-is direct regulation of private, fully-protected speech. 86 That,
however, is only a preliminary suggestion, and cannot take the place of
the more sustained judicial analysis of which the common-law methodology is capable. In any event, doctrinal progress cannot occur until the
Court focuses on this question without being distracted by the false
promise of content analysis.
In addition, within this highly scrutinized category of cases, the
Court must articulate, in more specific terms, which policies and approaches toward speech the First Amendment supports and which it forbids. The Court has shown itself to be sharply divided even on the
permissibility of a government purpose in enhancing diversity among
speakers, which appears to be the only free speech-enhancing interest
that the Court has recognized in its cases."8 7 The Court should establish
more completely why such a purpose might or might not enhance free
speech policies. Perhaps a more nuanced analysis is needed, identifying
what kinds of diversity enhancement might and might not be constitutionally acceptable. For example, can the state suppress or diminish the
speech of some in order to prevent others from being drowned out,
thereby increasing the diversity of viewpoints heard?8 ' Relatedly, can it
place burdens on the editorial discretion of publishers in order to promote diversity and the speech of those who might not otherwise be
heard? Moreover, does the nature of the media being regulated influence this analysis, and if so, why?289

The Court must also determine what, if any, other governmental
motives for regulating private speech are consistent with, and advance,
free speech goals. Is a policy of imposing special taxes on the media
consistent with First Amendment principles? Obviously not in the abdown the ordinance. See generally William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some
CautionaryNotes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1640-43 (1996) (raising questions
about Discovery Network's distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech); cf. Kagan,
supra note 86, at 482-83 (defending the Discovery Network decision as a proper application of motive
analysis).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 210-217.

287.

See Bhagwat, supra note 14, at 158-62 (discussing majority and dissenting opinions in

TurnerBroadcasting).
288. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n.55 (1976) (per curiam) (suggesting that such a
purpose is not consistent with the First Amendment); see also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2349-50 (1995). Elena Kagan argues that Buckley's
hostility to diversity-enhancement might be explained by a perception on the part of the Court that
such laws often mask hostility to the speech being suppressed or reduced. See Kagan, supra note 86,

at 468-69.
289. Compare Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding such a policy
unconstitutional with respect to the print media), with Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445

(1994) (suggesting that such a policy might withstand scrutiny with respect to cable television
operators).
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--but what if the tax were designed to raise funding to support

marginalized speech?

May the state require that political campaigns

allocate a certain percentage of their commercial time to a "serious discussion" -of the issues, thereby encouraging deliberative and robust political debate?2 9' Once the Court begins to consider explicitly what kinds
of speech regulation might actually advance First Amendment principles, the list of interesting questions is long and potentially endless. But
these issues must be addressed if the Court's free speech jurisprudence
is ever to become coherent.
Finally, as long as the government purpose is not illegitimate, balancing remains inevitable in a very large and important set of free
speech cases involving incidental or ancillary burdens on speech.292 In
addition, it seems likely that regulations of certain types of speech, including "indecent" speech293 and "commercial" speech,294 would be
290. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (holding that an
Arkansas tax on general interest magazines is unconstitutional); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (invalidating a Minnesota tax on paper and ink
products used by newspaper).
291.
Given the current, strongly laissez-faire bias of the Court's free speech case law, the
present Court would almost certainly answer "no." That should not, of course, end the debate about
the proper interpretation of the First Amendment. On this topic, see generally Sunstein, supra note
223.
292. Several categories of common First Amendment cases may fall into this category. First,
regulations of speech on government property may be a candidate for balancing analysis. See
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); Burson v. Freeman,
504 U.S. 191 (1992); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (also
involving regulation of expressive conduct). Though not usually described in those terms, this
category of cases might also encompass the Court's jurisprudence according lower constitutional
protection to television (and radio) broadcasters, if one considers broadcasters' use of the airwaves
to be use of "public property." See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); cf Turner
Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2456-58 (rejecting lower level of scrutiny for regulation of cable
television).
Second, regulation of expressive conduct, including the regulation of the conduct components of
otherwise protected speech, such as volume regulations or restrictions on aggressive panhandling,
might be so analyzed. See Krishna Consciousness,505 U.S. at 704-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (solicitation of money); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (nude dancing);
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (volume at a rock concert); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning a draft card); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (sound
truck on public streets). Both the Ward and Krishna Consciousness cases involved regulation of
speech on government property, but their principles would probably extend to fully private speech as
well. An interesting issue that arises here is whether political contributions or expenditures, of money
qualify as fully protected "core" speech, or as conduct intertwined with speech, which is subject to
some regulation for non-speech reasons, such as to limit corruption. See generally Colorado
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996) (presenting
various views on this issue without any majority opinion).
293. See Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996);
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
(1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Action for Children's Television
v. FCC (ACT II1), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996); cf.
Sable Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (striking down a ban on indecent telephone
messages).
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subject to balancing because they are considered to be "low-valued"
under the First Amendment, which means that the Court recognizes a
much greater range of allowable purposes for regulating such speech
than with respect to "core" speech.295 These general categories, however, are neither clearly defined nor well established, leaving a great deal
of ambiguity regarding precisely what type of scrutiny the Court will
employ in individual cases.
Under purpose scrutiny, therefore, it is critical that the Court clearly
identify which kinds of free speech cases are subject to ad hoc balancing review. It must then explicitly defer to the judgments of elected officials regarding the existence and strength of the government interests.
The reason for deference is clear: these cases, where a multitude of legitimate government objectives can be implicated, raise the countermajoritarian difficulty in the strongest possible way. The need for clarity exists because the Court's current doctrinal confusion might lead to
too much, or too little, deference to legislative judgments in individual
cases, thereby either sacrificing constitutional rights or impinging improperly on democratic prerogatives. For example, should courts defer
to legislative judgments regarding the harm caused to children by indecent speech? Should the Court defer to legislative judgments regarding
the need to regulate particular forms of advertising to prevent subtle
forms of deception, especially of minors? These questions cannot be
answered without a clear statement from the Court regarding the degree
of protection accorded to indecent and commercial speech.296 If such
speech is properly subject to relatively intrusive regulation, then the
Court should defer. If it is fully protected private speech, however, then
presumably First Amendment principles would shift the balance in favor
of speech. There is much doctrinal repair work to be done in the free
speech area, and the bulk of that work consists of clarifying the doctrinal lines that separate cases into the various categories of review.

294. See Florida Bar v. went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995); United States v. Edge Broad.
Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). It should be noted that commercial speech is a very narrow category, referring only to
speech designed to accomplish no more than proposing a commercial transaction. See City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 421 (1993); cf. Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S.
1030, 1051-54 (1991) (arguing that speech by an attorney regarding pending cases is not commercial
speech subject to greater regulation).
295. For example, the Court permits regulation of indecent speech for the amorphous purpose of
"protect[ing] children," Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2386, and permits regulation of commercial
speech to prevent deception or fraud, see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1507
(1996), neither of which would be permissible reasons to regulate fully protected speech, such as
political speech.
296. Cf. DenverArea, 116 S. Ct. at 2391; 44Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1507 ("Rhode Island errs in
concluding that all commercial speech regulations are subject to a similar form of constitutional

review.") (emphasis in original).
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C. Other DoctrinalAreas
In other areas of constitutional jurisprudence, I can give only some
preliminary thoughts about areas where a move toward purpose scrutiny
would lead to greater doctrinal clarity. With abortion rights, the Court's
leading decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey
present together a classic example of the way in which the definition of
a constitutional right is inextricably tied to the identification of permissible and impermissible governmental purposes. 97 Some ambiguity
does exist, however, in the Court's most recent statements in this area
regarding precisely what type of scrutiny courts should apply to abortion regulations. In particular, the question exists as to whether the
abortion right remains "fundamental," or has been demoted to mere
"liberty interest" status.29 Under the purpose scrutiny framework, the
question is whether the Court will subject abortion regulations to limited-purpose analysis, or whether it will merely engage in balancing,
combined with prohibitions on certain impermissible purposes such as
the direct hindering of a woman's ability to choose an abortion. To
give the lower courts real guidance on how to review legislation limiting
abortion rights, the Court must clear up this ambiguity, and state candidly where the abortion right falls within the Court's doctrinal framework. In some peripheral areas of its abortion case law the Court has
already done so. For example, in its cases reviewing parental consent
requirements for abortions by minors, the Court has quite clearly
adopted a balancing approach, presumably because of the lesser degree
of protection generally accorded by the Constitution to minors.119 On
the critical question of abortion rights for adults, however, ambiguity
persists.3 ""
In addition to its abortion-rights jurisprudence, the Court's privacy
doctrine would be benefited substantially by a clearer exposition of the
status, and contours, of the other purportedly "fundamental" privacy
rights the Court has recognized, including the right to marriage and the
right to parental relationships."' Presently, the Court's jurisprudence
makes clear that some regulation of these rights is permitted, but leaves
to speculation precisely what regulations will pass scrutiny. Moreover,
297. See supra text accompanying notes 162-172, 230-23 1.
298. See Faigman, supra note 96, at 1566-71.
299. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985) (searches of minors on school property entitled to greater deference because of
the special safety needs involved).
300. See Brownstein, supra note 23, at 885-92 (discussing difficulty in reconciling the Casey
Court's decision striking down spousal notification provision of abortion law but upholding 24-hour
waiting period).
301. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972) (right to parental relationship).
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much of the confusion is rooted in the Court's failure to define precisely the scope of the rights that it has recognized-a failure that is
magnified by the non-textual nature of these rights.3 °2 Because the
definition of rights and the evaluation of legitimate governmental purposes are necessarily tied together, the Court's silence has stunted its
ability to produce a clear jurisprudence regarding governmental purposes in the privacy area.
Finally, as with its free speech doctrine, the Court's jurisprudence
with respect to the religion clauses of the First Amendment is in disarray. A reinvigorated focus on governmental purposes can only help to
clarify thought. For example, in the free exercise context, the Court had
long purported to apply "strict scrutiny" to all burdens on religious
exercise, direct or incidental. In reality, it had done so haphazardly. 3
Finally, in the Employment Division v. Smith3 decision, the Court put
an end to all constitutional scrutiny of incidental burdens, limiting its
scrutiny to direct, and therefore presumptively improperly motivated,
regulations of religious exercise. Congress promptly responded by restoring the "old" strict scrutiny standard for all substantial burdens on
religion, direct or otherwise."' But this cannot be correct; direct and
incidental burdens on religious exercise must be evaluated differently,
just as they are in the free speech context, because they place quite different burdens on constitutional interests and raise quite different concerns about the propriety of government action. Incidental burdens
must be subject to a balancing test-though perhaps a weighted onewhile direct regulations are properly subject to searching purpose scrutiny.
The Court's establishment clause jurisprudence suffers from even
more thorough confusion. The Lemon v. Kurtzman"° "test," the mainstay of the Court's doctrine in this area, makes purpose inquiry an exBut Lemon has been followed only
plicit part of its analysis."°
inconsistently in recent years, while the "coercion" test favored by
some Justices of the Court seems to exclude any examination of governmental purposes. 8 Because the Establishment Clause is more of a
"structural" than a rights-oriented limitation on governmental power, it
is not entirely clear whether purpose should play the same role in this
302. See generally Schneider, supra note 32, at 86-89.
303. See Doff, supra note 18, at 1210-19 (discussing free exercise cases).
304. 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990).
305. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb).
306. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

307.
308.

See id. at 612-13.
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992); County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater

Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 659-63 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and

dissenting in part).
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area as in the other areas discussed above. At a minimum, however, it
seems clear that governmental actions motivated by certain purposessuch as an explicit desire to favor one religion over others-constitute
an establishment of religion and are unconstitutional. In any event, the
Court should clarify precisely the role of purpose scrutiny in this area
and how the inquiry should be structured.
CONCLUSION

Despite the broad range of this Article, its ultimate conclusion is
relatively simple. In recent years the Supreme Court has shown an increased interest in the purposes behind government action. This movement is to be applauded. The relative expertise and constitutional role
of the Court makes it better suited to purpose scrutiny than the means
scrutiny that has dominated constitutional analysis since the New Deal.
The Court's movement toward what is in my view a superior mode of
analysis is far from complete, however. The Court badly needs to develop a framework for purpose scrutiny to replace the essentially ad hoc
approach that it now employs. Moreover, to satisfy the requirements of
judicial legitimacy in a democratic state, such an approach must be
rooted in the constitutional text and its underlying principles, rather
than in untethered judgments about the strengths and weaknesses of
particular policies. The jurisprudence must also be flexible, recognizing
that different constitutional provisions are based on different principles
and therefore impose distinct limitations on government action. Although these important details still need to be worked out, the new jurisprudence of governmental interests and purposes offers promise for
increasing the coherence of constitutional decision making and doctrine.
On a more specific level, I have suggested that if the Court adopts
constitutionally-rooted purpose scrutiny, it will properly invalidate improperly-motivated legislation or regulation even when the legislation
falls outside the "heightened scrutiny" tiers of the Court's current
doctrine. Such decisions are not judicial usurpations of the authority of
the elected branches. Rather, they are legitimate exercises of constitutional authority. To be sure, this authority must be exercised with care
and restraint-this is the enduring lesson of the Lochner era-but restraint need not lead to abdication of judicial responsibility, as the modem Court has tended to believe.
At the other end of the scrutiny spectrum, I have argued that the
Court needs to develop a doctrinal framework to explain what it labels,
but are not, "compelling government interests." In particular, the
Court should declare what its cases imply: when a fundamental constitutional right is at stake, it will not simply accept any proffered govern-
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mental purpose to justify infringement of that right-even if the relevant governing body considers it to be "compelling."
Indeed, the
Court should recognize that some infringements cannot be justified by
any governmental purpose. More broadly, the Court must develop a
methodology through which it can specify which government purposes
can be advanced to justify actions that raise special constitutional concerns. I have suggested that the Court can find the beginnings of such a
methodology in the idea that when a constitutional right is directly
threatened, only governmental purposes that advance the principles underlying that right can justify the action.
Finally and most importantly, this Article calls for deference in the
vast number of cases where neither of the two analyses set forth above
are applicable. In such situations, the courts must explicitly recognize
that elected officials, not courts, are best suited to define and assess the
importance of public purposes. Basic principles of democratic legitimacy prohibit courts from second-guessing such democratic judgments
on an ad hoc basis, without grounding in the Constitution. Courts cannot shirk their ultimate duty to safeguard constitutional rights from
majoritarian intrusion, but neither should they forget the source of their
authority and responsibility to do so.

